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1 Why studying the economics of science?
Special attention has to be given to science by economists. Although the implementation
of research results takes time to reach the common use, the latter has a direct impact
on economic growth. For instance, medical research has enabled to expand considerably
life expectancy, as underlined by The Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration
(2008) for antiretroviral therapies. Furthermore, as studied by Rosenberg and Mokyr,
the relationship between science and economic growth is complex and non-linear. The
first reason is that, as equipment plays a major role in scientific discovery, economic
growth has an impact of the speed at which science is produced. The second reason is
that technological breakthroughs play a key role in encouraging scientists in the public
sector to develop new programs and research agendas. In addition, an interesting aspect
of science is its social value.
1.1 The social value of science
“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it
is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively
possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself
into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its
1
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peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses
the whole of it.”
In this citation, Arrow explains in 1990 (1967 edition) why knowledge shares the
properties of a public good, which was first noticed by Jefferson. Knowledge is not
depleted when shared, and once it is made public others cannot easily be excluded from
its use. Besides, adding one user is almost costless. Interestingly, and unlike other
public goods, the stock of knowledge increases when the number of users increases. This
implies that the transmission of knowledge is a positive sum game, as denoted by Foray
(2004).
However, in the competitive research market, the non-excludability nature of knowl-
edge allows free-riders to join the game. This provides too low incentives for scientists.
Nevertheless, the current science reward system counterbalances the lack of incentives
created by the public nature of knowledge.
1.2 Understanding the scientist’s incentives
To begin with, a major incentive for scientists is that they aim at establishing the
priority of a discovery. Merton (1957) was the first highlighting this fact, explaining
that it has been a constant characteristic of science for more than three centuries.
Rewarding priority can take several forms. For instance, eponymy attaches the name of
the scientist to the discovery. Many scientists have left their mark: Planck’s constant,
the Copernician system, and more recently, the Higgs particle. In addition, rewards can
take the form of prizes. The Nobel Prize is the most famous, but many others exist,
such as the Shaw Prize and the Spinoza Prize, which represent more than a million US
dollars each. Another and more common way of rewarding priority is publication. To
that extent, the contribution of a scientist is often measured by using the number of
citations of the latter’s publications.
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Nevertheless, the fight for priority implies that scientists are incentivized to disclose
their work quickly. The delay between writing an article and submitting it can be very
short, as well as the delay between the receipt of a manuscript and its publication.
For example, the journal Science asks that referee reports should be returned within
7 days of receipt so that the latter publishes quickly following the editorial decision
to accept. When two scientists disclose similar discoveries, the fight can be harsh to
argue for priority. For instance, Newton took extreme measures to establish that he, not
Leibniz, was the inventor of the calculus, as stated by Merton (1969). In this respect,
science is often viewed as a “winner-take-all” contest, leaving only little rent for the
followers. This scheme is partly due to the fact that scientific effort is not observable, as
underlined by Dasgupta (1989). However, the followers can also add social values, by
undertaking replication and verification activities. Taking the example of cancer cure,
many treatments can be found, each of them bringing added value to society.
Furthermore, monetary rewards is another strong incentive to keep scientists in-
novating. These rewards split in two kinds. The first kind does not depend on the
scientist’s success in the priority race. It compensates for the risk taken when searching
for an uncertain result. The second kind is attributed to the winner and reflects her
contribution to science. In this respect, counts of publication and citations play a major
role in the allocation of academic promotions, as studied by Hicks (2007). As a matter
of fact, scientists working in academia are often fully insured and earn roughly the same
salary, no matter their place in the priority race. The winner position is rather rewarded
by other monetary forms, such as a prize money, speaking and consulting fees.
Finally, another type of reward which boosts the scientist’s motivation is the satis-
faction derived from solving the puzzle. In this respect, Feynman (1999), a 1965 Nobel
Prize winner, said: “I don’t see that it makes any point that someone in the Swedish
Academy decides that this work is noble enough to receive a prize. I’ve already got
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the prize. The prize is the pleasure of finding the thing out, the kick in the discovery...”
This sort of reward makes science a worldsize game in which players are scientists. As
underlined by Stephan (2010), future research should make a “special emphasis [...]
on the public nature of knowledge and characteristics of the reward structure that
encourage the production and sharing of knowledge”.
2 The quality of publications
These last decades, the quality of published works has been placed on the top list of
science agenda. Now more than ever, the latter has been questionned with the Covid-19
crisis.
2.1 Why is it a major issue?
To begin with, fake news can be spread very quickly. To that extent, new results should
be considered carefully. Indeed, Ioannidis (2020) emphasizes that, based on Altimetric
Scores, the most discussed and visible scientific article over all the articles publishes in
the past eight years is a preprint from Pradhan et al. (2020), which asserts that the
Covid-19 protein shares similarities with the HIV-1 protein. Even though the authors
retracted the paper, the latter keeps making noise by stirring the passions. Furthermore,
Kupferschmidt (2020) reports that the New England Journal of Medicine published
last January a study claiming that a first asymptomatic case has transmitted the virus.
Nevertheless, researchers did not ask, but the latter had symptoms.
Moreover, it seems that hot topics articles are more likely to be published faster
than the others, especially those which concern transmission, morbidity and mortality.
Palayew et al. (2020) alarm that the way Covid-19 articles were published “raises
concerns about the quality of the evidence base and about the risk of misinformation
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being spread with harmful consequences”. Focusing on published and preprint reports of
prediction models for diagnosing of Covid-19, Wynants et al. (2020) show that models
are poorly reported and the reported performance too optimistic, with a high risk of
bias. They ask for more rigor and adherence to the TRIPOD (transparent reporting of a
multivariable prediction model for individual prognosis or diagnosis) reporting guideline.
Besides, a large volume of research has been produced since the beginning of the
pandemic crisis, in a surprisingly short amount of time. In this respect, Da Silva et
al. (2020) report that over 23.500 articles were published between January and June
2020. As analyzed by Palayew et al. (2020), an average of 367 Covid-19 journal articles
were published per week, from February to April 2020. Surprisingly, the median time
from submission to acceptance was just six days. Comparing these results with the 2014
Ebola pandemia, only four articles per week were published from August to October
2014, with a mean time to acceptance of 15 days. According to Himmelstein (2016), the
median delay from submission to acceptance is generally around 100 days. All these
facts question the quality of the research published.
In addition, the publications quality issue is strongly related to the publication bias,
which Brodeur et al. (2016) highlight. Using test statistics from studies published
between 2005 and 2011 in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political
Economy and the Quarterly Journal of Economics, they show that the observed distri-
bution of tests has a weird two-humped camel shape, with missing p-values between
0.25 and 0.10. They suggest that scientists inflate the value of just-rejected tests by
choosing particular specifications. Furthermore, Ioannidis (2005a) underlines that “for
many current scientific fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate
measures of the prevailing bias”.
Over the last decade, many attempts have been made to fasten the publication
process, which is deplored to be long. The impact on the publication quality is unclear.
6 INTRODUCTION
A first attempt is the pre-print option, which is a version of an article that the author
submits to the editorial board of a scientific journal. The article is then reviewed by
researchers who evaluate the content of the article and ask for clarifications. This stage
is called peer-review. In this respect, journals like eLife and The Journal of Clinical
Investigation announced that authors will only be asked for revisions to clarify and
better present their results. In addition, eLife encourages the authors to post their
submissions as preprints. This could be an answer to the current unavailability of
reviewers who are focused with their own research and do not receive direct benefits
from reviewing. Besides, journals offer a fast-track publication option, which enables
scientists to pay a higher cost to get reviewed and published faster. Despite journals
claim that the quality is as good as standard publication process, further investigation
must be done.
Various solutions could be implemented to answer to the worrying publication
quality. For instance, journals could enforce strong standards during public-health
emergencies to avoid possibly poor research publication quality. In this respect, the
European Association of Science Editors (EASE) “urges all involved in collecting and
publishing data related to the pandemic to adhere to ethical guidelines, and to follow
standard reporting guidelines, for example CONSORT for clinical trials and STROBE
for epidemiological studies” (Bazdaric and Smart, 2020). Besides, effort should be made
to develop multiple independent quality-assured systems, which relies more on public
fundings than on the private sector. To this purpose, several curated databases were
elaborated, such as LitCovid (US National Library of Medicine), Novel Coronavirus
Research Compendium (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health) and Publons
(Clarivate Analytics).
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2.2 The replicability problem
Another way to increase the publications quality is to check the articles’ outcomes after
their publication. After a publication, if another article proves the same results with
same or different methods and data, it is called a “replication”. If instead, the results of
the new study are not statistically significant or contradict those of the initial study, it
is called a “refutation”. As a matter of fact, Ioannidis (2005a) highlights that science is
going through a “reproducibility crisis”.
Indeed, many replication attempts have failed. One critical concern is public health
care. In this respect, the publications quality has a direct impact on the way patients are
treated, in other words, it is a matter of life or death. To that extent, Ioannidis (2005b)
analyzes clinical studies of three major general clinical or specialty journals between
1990 and 2003. He finds that 44% of 45 medical studies are replicated. Looking at cancer
drugs, Davis et al. (2017) prove that 57% of 68 drugs entered the European market
without evidence of benefit on survival or quality of life. Besides, after a minimum
of 3.3 years after their launch, there was still no conclusive evidence that these drugs
have improved the quality or improved the patients’ life. Using multiple random sets,
Mischiels et al. (2005) study the stability of microarray gene-expressions to predict
cancer outcome. They find that the list of genes identified as predictors of prognosis
was highly unstable and that the outcomes depends strongly on the selection of patients
in the training sets. All these studies mention a poor research replicability.
The replicability issue reaches every research field and the publications’ results are
often over-estimated. In biomedicine, Iqbal et al. (2016) study a random sample of
441 biomedical journal articles published between 2000 and 2014. As a matter of fact,
there were only four replication studies and only 16 studies with data including in
a systematic review or meta-analysis. 1 This shows both that there are not enough
1A meta-analysis is a statistical analysis that combines the results of multiple scientific studies. It
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replication studies and a lack of transparency. In a meta-analysis performed on 370
genetic studies, Ioannidis et al. (2001) find statistically significant heterogeneity in 14
out of 36 groups of genetic association studies on the same topic with stronger effects in
the first study of a topic than subsequent replication attempts in 25 cases.
Furthermore, the replicability rate varies accross disciplines. In cell biology, Begley
and Ellis (2012) find that the latter is around 11%. In psychology, the Open Science
Collaboration (2015), a conglomerate formed by scientists, find a rate of 50%. In
economics, Camerer et al. (2016) study 18 experiment studies published in the American
Economic Review and the Quarterly Journal of Economics between 2011 and 2014.
They find that the replicability rate is between 67% and 78%, which is higher than in
the other disciplines.
Finally, the publications outcomes directs the way money is spent in both the public
and the private sectors. To that extent, reproducibility of research should be promoted.
Sadly, Freedman et al. (2015) deplores that 28 billion dollars are spent each year in
the US on preclinical research which is not reproducible. In this way, journals should
incentivize replication and refutation. Some have encouraged transparency through
codes of ethics, such as the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences
(BITSS) and the Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP).
In addition, several journals now devote part of their publications to replication
studies, such as the Royal Society Open Science, the Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General and the Journal of Applied Econometrics. Moreover, new journals have been
fully dedicated to replication, such as ReScienceX, a free-to-publish, free-to-read and
peer-reviewed journal recently created by Nature. In this respect, more attention is
dedicated to replication and refutation.
occurs when there are several scientific studies dealing with the same issue, with each study reporting
measurements which are expected to have some degree of error.
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3 Science 2.0
Nowadays, the use of Internet is so common that we would not even think how to
do without it. It has incredibly fasten the speed at which research is conducted and
information is spread almost instantaneously all around the world. It was created only
a few decades ago and yet has become necessary to undertake scientific research. To
that extent, Science 2.0 is a term used to describe the new way of making science with
digitization. It is often related to open science, a movement which aims at making
science available to everyone.
3.1 The new challenges of Science 2.0
With digitization come several concerns such as open access, open data, transparency
and collaboration, as noticed by Dr. Stephane Berghmans (Kisjes, 2015). The first
concern, open access, aims at providing worldwide access to printed and handwritten
information. In this respect, many open-access journals have been created, which remove
or reduce barriers to copying or reuse by applying an open license for copyright. For
instance, the Public Library of Science (PLOS) is an open-access publisher which hosts
several journals, such as PLOS Biology, created in 2003, and PLOS ONE, created in
2006. Theoretical Economics is a peer-reviewed open-access journal established in 2006.
The second concern, open data, should not be neglected. Data is a valuable product
of science which is underutilized and shared, partly due to the stockage and hostage
needs. The development of new tools to meet the needs implies considerable investment.
Interestingly, digitization appears to be a valuable solution to make the cultural and
historical heritage accessible to everyone and searchable through the Web. Once this
heritage is digitized, it can be treated with scientific studies. In this respect, a digitization
policy must be implemented, as underlined by Bountouri (2017). First, human and
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financial resources, as well as technological equipment, must be efficiently used to carry
out archives’ digitization. Second, a selection must be made beyound the huge amount of
manuscripts. Third, laws must be enforced to frame the archives’ digitization. Copyright
is one of the many issues.
The third concern, transparency, is crucial in our highly interconnected world. As
deplored by Lazer et al. (2018), its lack can generate fake news, which are unfortunately
quickly spread worldwide. Furthermore, the transparency matter induces the creation
of platforms to stock data. In this respect, Mendeley, a social network for scientists
created in 2012, launched Mendeley Data, a platform in which researchers put their
research data to be cited, shared and secured. In addition, journals, such as MethodsX,
an open access journal, are created to enable scientist to publish their methods, thus
facilitating their use by peers.
The fourth concern, collaboration, is inherent to the huge amount of data created and
produces synergies. In this respect, the European Commission (EC) currently funds the
Facilitate Open Science Training for European Research program (FOSTER), which was
created in 2017 to help scientists using efficiently digital tools. In addition, the EC created
the Open Science Policy Platform (OSPP) in 2016, which gives recommendations to
foster and frame open science. One of them is to make research data Findable, Accessible,
Interoperable and Reusable (FAIR). Furthermore, collaboration can invite non-experts
to participate to research.
3.2 Citizen science
In this respect, citizen science (CS) has become a new and quite useful way of conducting
research, which goes one step forward towards democratizing science. Also named “crowd
science”, “crowdsourced science” or “community science”, CS requires the help of non-
experts to implement scientific projects. Besides, the OSPP has made CS one of her
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top priorities in her research agenda. Interestingly, Theobald et al. (2015) estimate that
388 biodiversity CS projects contribute between $667 million to $2.5 billion annually.
Interestingly, some projects became very popular. This is partly due to the gam-
ification of the CS project, which boosts the citizens’ motivation. For instance, the
FoldIt project was created in 2008 to help scientists studying proteins’ shapes. Citizens
contribute through an online game in which they use their spatial skills to design proteins.
Two years after its launch, 200,000 citizens already participated. Eyewire, a CS project
created in 2012 by a Princeton University scientist, is designed as a brain-mapping
puzzle game to map retinal neurons. Over five years, 250,000 citizens from 150 countries
have participated to that project.
Another famous project is Besides, platforms were developed to host CS projects.
iNaturalist is a website jointly created by the California Academy of Sciences and National
Geographic. Up to now, it has gathered more than 52 millions of observations about
nature. The CS platform eBird, created in 2002, aims at collecting birds informations
worldwide. Zooniverse is a platform created in 2007, which currently gathers 50 CS
projects. A million citizens have already joined the website. This platform is actually
an extension of the GalaxyZoo project, which aimed at classify galaxies by treating over
a million of space data.
More recently, CS has been quite useful in the recent Covid-19 crisis. For instance,
FoldIt launched last March a program to assist scientists to find a protein which will
neutralize the virus. Besides, the platform EU-Citizen.Science proposes links to several
citizen science projects which aim at find a cure to the virus. In addition, many online
resources are available through open access and open science websites, including The
Lancet and Springer Nature, which help the use of CS to fight against the pandemia.
Furthermore, Muki Haklay, a professor at the University College London, distin-
guishes different levels of citizens’ participations. In the first one, called “crowdsourcing”,
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citizens act as sensors, which means that they participate to environmental observation
and data collection through the use of smartphones and networked devices. In the second
one, called “distributed intelligence”, they act as basic interpreters. In the third one,
called “participatory science”, they contribute to problem definition and data collection.
In another level called “extreme citizen science”, citizens and scientists fully collaborate
in problem definition, collection and data analysis.
However, there are some limitations which constrain the CS use. First, all projects are
not always suited to CS if the research method is complex or if the work is very repetitive.
In this way, some CS projects fail to be implemented because of limited participation.
According to Cappa et al. (2018), this problem can be solved by giving to citizens
correct incentives, such as monetary compensation and public online acknowledgment.
In this respect, the way CS is conducted could follow a private-collective research model.
A second limitation is that the volonteer participation of non-experts may introduce
a bias in the data, as noted by Lukyanenko et al. (2016). To answer this worrying CS
projects’ quality, Kosmala et al. (2016) claim that successful projects lean on methods
which increase data accuracy and account for bias. These methods include iterative
project development, volunteer training and testing, expert validation, replication across
volunteers, and statistical modeling of systematic error. Besides, Soroye et al. (2018)
compared two datasets reporting butterflies species, one from a CS project called
eButterfly, and the second coming from professionally collected observations. They
show that the former is of high quality, which is due to the expert vetting process that
eButterfly used. Besides, five new species were reported and geographic distribution
information was improved for over 80% of species in the combined dataset when CS
data was included. In addition, Gardiner et al. (2012), argue that the cost-effectiveness
of citizen science data can outweigh data quality issues, if it is properly managed.
Furthermore, many impetus have been made to foster the use of CS. For instance,
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the Citizen Science Association, an organization which connects citizens to participate
to scientific projects, created in 2016 an open-access journal called Citizen Science:
Theory and Practice. Furthermore, CitizenScience.gov, an official government website,
was created in 2016 to accelerate the use of crowdsourcing and CS across the U.S.
government.
Finally, the impact of CS could go far beyond its first goal. In this respect, Bethany
Brookshire, an American scientific journalist, writes “if citizens are going to live with
the benefits or potential consequences of science [...], it’s incredibly important to make
sure that they are not only well informed about changes and advances in science and
technology, but that they also are able to influence the science policy decisions that could
impact their lives”. To that extent, CS ethics should be considered, as it arises issues such
as intellectual property. In this way, the European Citizen Science Association (ECSA)
published in 2015 Ten principles of Citizen Science, which states that “the leaders
of citizen science projects take into consideration legal and ethical issues surrounding
copyright, intellectual property, data sharing agreements, confidentiality, attribution,
and the environmental impact of any activities”.
4 Summary of chapters
4.1 Refutation in Research: How to Improve Publication Qual-
ity
In the first chapter of the thesis, 2 I examine how incentives for refutation affect
publication quality. I build a sequential model of public experimentation with two
scientists, a researcher (she) and a refuter (he). There exists a hypothesis which can be
2This chapter has been published in the Annals of Economics and Statistics.
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either valid or invalid. The two scientists are uncertain about the hypothesis’ validity
and start the game with the same initial belief that the hypothesis is valid. At the
beginning of the game, the researcher starts experimenting. She chooses when to publish
a result confirming a hypothesis. While experimenting, she can observe for free some
bad news which perfectly reveals that the hypothesis is invalid. If no bad news has
arrived yet, the researcher’s belief that the hypothesis is valid increases deterministically.
The publication quality corresponds to the probability that the hypothesis is valid at
the publication time. Once the result is published, the refuter starts experimenting but,
unlike the researcher, he can choose between working on refutation or on an outside
safe option at any time. His learning process is similar to the researcher. If he succeeds
in refutation, the researcher incurs a refutation cost.
I find that the equilibrium belief at which the refuter stops experimenting and
switches to the safe option is unique and does not depend on the initial prior. When
scientists are initially very optimistic about the hypothesis’ confirmation, none of the
scientists experiments and the publication quality is equal to the initial belief. When
they are initially pessimistic but the refutation cost is high, the researcher fully prevents
the refuter from experimenting and the latter switches directly to the safe option after
the result publication. When they are initially optimistic and the refutation cost is low,
the researcher does not experiment but the refuter does: there is a refutation risk. When
they are initially pessimistic and the refutation cost is high, the researcher experiments,
but not fully deters the refuter from experimenting. There exists a refutation risk. In
this case, the higher the refutation rewards, the lower the equilibrium publication quality
in case the researcher is more efficient than the refuter. As a matter of fact, this result
contradicts the literature’s main policy recommendation, as Hamermesh (2007) stated.
The opposite result holds when the refuter is more efficient. This second result is in line
with Hamermesh (2007). When both scientists are equally efficient, refutation rewards
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have no impact on the publication quality.
In an extension, I study the case where the researcher’s experimentation is private,
which means that she can fraud and publish a result she knows to be wrong. Looking
for a perfect Bayesian equibrium in pure strategies, the refuter cannot distinguish a
researcher who received bad news from one who did not. I prove that the time during
which the refuter experiments is fixed and does not depend on the publication time. In
this respect, the researcher does not experiment and the publication quality is always
equal to the intial belief. Hence, the publication quality is lower than in the public
experimentation case, suggesting that transparency improves research quality. This last
result is similar to Ozdenoren et al. (2019).
4.2 Citizen science vs. traditional science: the speed/quality
trade-off
In the second chapter of the thesis, I examine the tradeoff of the scientist who has
access to citizen science (CS) or traditional science (TS) to undertake her research. An
infinite sequence of projects are successively available on a discrete time horizon. Each
project is a public good with some value. There are three players, a scientist and two
citizens. For each project, a scientist (she) chooses to implement it with CS or TS.
With TS, she implements the project for sure but it takes one period. With CS, the
project is implemented immediately, which is in line with Watson and Floridi (2016),
but it requires the citizens’ help. Each citizen (he) chooses to exert effort or not. The
effort cost is privately observed by each citizen and depends on his motivation. If he
is motivated, then effort is costless. If he is not motivated, then effort is costly. The
implementation success of the project is increasing in the number of citizens exerting
effort, as suggested by Nov et al. (2014).
In the unique citizens’ Bayesian Nash equilibrium, a motivated citizen always exerts
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effort and a non-motivated one never does. The “CS quality” corresponds to the ex-ante
probability that the project is implemented with CS. When the successive projects have
the same value, the scientist’s strategy is a cut-off: when the value of the project is
above some threshold, she uses CS. Below this threshold, she uses TS. This result is
generalized to any sequence of project values which satisfies the Markov property .
In an extension, two scientists compete to attract citizens on their project. The
scientist’s probability to attract citizens on her project increases in her investment cost
and decreases in the cost invested by her competitor. I focus on stationnary symmetric
Markovian equilibria, in which scientists make the same choice at every period. The
scientist faces two types of choice to make. If her competitor has chosen TS for the last
project, then she faces no competitor if she chooses CS for the current project. If her
competitor has chosen CS for the last project, then they fight if both chooses CS for
the current projects. As a matter of fact, I show that the equilibrium in pure strategies
is unique: for sufficiently high project values, both scientists always choose CS. For
sufficiently low values, both scientists always choose TS. In both cases, there exist no
equilibrium in mixed strategies. For intermediate project values, the unique equilibrium
is in mixed strategies: if one scientist is stuck with choosing TS at the former period,
the other one always chooses CS. Otherwise, they both mix between TS and CS.
4.3 Citizen science and preemption
In the third chapter of the thesis, I study the tradeoff of a scientist choosing between
citizen science (CS) and traditional science (TS) to undertake her research. After time 0,
there exists a new idea which can be studied. Two scientists can discover this idea at any
time. Their objective is to publish it before the other one does. However, competition is
only potential as the time at which a scientist discovers the idea is not observable by
her competitor. At the scientist’s discovery time, she faces two technological choices,
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which are not available past that time. The first one is TS: she takes time to let the idea
mature. There exists an optimal maturation delay which maximizes her publication
payoff with TS without any competitor. With the second choice, called CS, the scientist
involves the citizens’ help to publish instantaneously the idea. However, she incurs a
fixed cost to make the idea available to citizens, as reported by Bonney et al. (2009).
Moreover, the latters are non-experts so there is some risk error that the publication is
of bad quality, which brings her no payoff. This uncertain quality is asserted by Nov et
al. (2014).
Focusing on Bayesian pure-strategy equilibria, I prove that there exist two kinds
of symmetric stationary equilibria. When CS is low-cost, every scientist chooses CS.
Otherwise, everyone chooses TS. Besides, I study equilibria in which every scientist
chooses TS before a discovery time threshold and CS after. There exists no such
equilibrium when it satisfies one of these two assumptions: i) the threshold discovery
time is lower than the equilibrium publication time of the scientist discovering the idea
at time 0 and ii) the equilibrium scientists’ strategy is continuous at the threshold
discovery time. At last, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium in which scientists
choose different technological choices. These results suggest that the existence of the CS
choice leaves no room for adaptation time. If CS is low-cost, even scientists discovering
the idea early choose CS and have no time to adjust the technological change.
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Refutation in Research: How to
Improve Publication Quality
Abstract I examine how incentives for refutation affect publication quality. I build
a sequential model of public experimentation with two scientists, a researcher and a
refuter. The researcher chooses when to publish a result confirming a hypothesis, with a
probability that the result has type I error. The publication quality corresponds to the
probability that the hypothesis is valid, which is the complement of the probability of
type I error. Once the result is published, the refuter starts experimenting but, unlike
the researcher, he can choose between working on refutation or on an outside safe option
at any time. When scientists are initially pessimistic about the hypothesis’ confirmation
and when refutation is costly for the researcher, the higher the refutation rewards, the
lower the equilibrium publication quality in case the researcher is more efficient than the
refuter. The opposite result holds when the refuter is more efficient. In an extension,
when the researcher’s experimentation is private, I prove that the publication quality is
lower than in the public experimentation case, suggesting that transparency improves
research quality.
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1 Introduction
The provision of high-quality scientific research has received much attention in the
last few decades, as noticed by The Economist (2013). Besides, according to Ioannidis
(2005a), science is currently undergoing a “reproducibility crisis”. This is particularly
due to the high number of refutations. Refutation contrasts with replication, which
consists in the repetition of a research study to determine if the findings can be applied
to other data and methods. Hence, refutation occurs if the replication study’s results
are not statistically significant or contradict those of the initial study. As a matter
of fact, many replication attempts failed. In cell biology, Begley and Ellis (2012) find
that replication succeeds in only 11% of the attempted cases. In psychology, The Open
Science Collaboration (2015), a conglomerate formed by scientists, shows that only half
of the published results they consider are successfully replicated. These studies highlight
that publication quality is a major issue and that both refutation and replication
should be encouraged to increase research quality. Refutation issues concern also public
health care: Ioannidis (2005b) shows that out of 45 medical studies from 1990-2004
claiming that an analyzed therapy is effective, only 44% are successfully replicated.
More strikingly, in a study published in the British Medical Journal, Davis et al. (2017)
examine cancer drugs approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) between
2009 and 2013. All new cancer drugs are given Europe-wide market approval through
this agency. They find that 57% (39 drugs over 68) have no supporting evidence of
better survival or quality of life when they enter the market. Moreover, a significant
minority of drugs (12%) are approved solely on the basis of a single arm study. These
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findings question the quality of research conducted before a drug’s approval, in addition
to the paucity of studies conducted on each drug.
Hence, the debate about the reproducibility of research involves not only the scientific
world, but also firms, policymakers and the public opinion. Sadly, Freedman et al. (2015)
claims that every year, 28 billion dollars are spent in the US on preclinical research
which is not reproducible. Besides, refutation is not a practice encouraged by academics
and journals. Indeed, incentives are missing for researchers and journals: research
prizes such as the Nobel prize reward creative and innovative research (but neither
refutation nor replication), and journals competing for novelty have only little interest
in refutations. As a matter of fact, Mueller-Langer et al. (2019) show that between
1974 and 2014, 0.1% of publications in the top 50 economics journals were replication
studies. As emphasized by Hamermesh (2007), “the rewards to within-study scientific
replication are small”. In addition, refutation is not easy to implement in practice. Data
and methods used by original papers are not always available and for some studies
conducting experiments, replication attempts can be very costly. Refutation also implies
challenging a peer. Mentioning a heated discussion caused by a replication attempt in
epidemiology, Humphreys (2015) deplores that it can “contribute to the polarization
of [a] discussion, make it hard for authors to acknowledge errors, and inhibit learning
from this kind of replication exercise”. Even though it is argued that journals should
encourage replication by enforcing standards, scientists themselves, as Bruce Alberts,
then editor of Science, emphasized the “need to develop a value system where simply
moving on from one’s mistakes without publicly acknowledging them severely damages,
rather than protects, a scientific reputation”.
Hopefully, many efforts have been done among the scientific community to encourage
the research reproducibility. For instance, the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in
the Social Sciences (BITSS) was created in 2012 to reward transparent practices through
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the Leamer-Rosenthal Prizes. Furthermore, numerous journals, like the Transactions
on Replication Research (TRR), have signed the Transparency and Openness Promo-
tion (TOP) guidelines. The Center for Open Science created it in 2015 to increase
transparency standards. Moreover, several journals created a section fully dedicated to
replication, such as the Journal of Experimental Psychology: General and the Journal
of Applied Econometrics. In addition, the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation
have launched a replication programme to “improve the quality and reliability of impact
evaluation evidence used for development decision-making”. Besides, the International
Journal for Re-Views in Empirical Economics (IREE) was initiated in 2017 to publish
only replication studies. Step by step, publication quality is strenghened through all
these advances.
To shed light on these issues, I study in this chapter a model in which the publication
quality depends on refutation incentives, represented as rewards for refutation’s success.
In my model, there exists a hypothesis which can be either valid or invalid. Two scientists
are uncertain about the hypothesis’ validity and can conduct experiments to check it.
At the beginning of the game, they have the same initial belief that the hypothesis is
valid. They experiment sequentially. The first one, the researcher (she), starts working
at time 0. While experimenting, she can observe for free some bad news which perfectly
reveal that the hypothesis is invalid. Bad news are better suited than good news as
there always remains some uncertainty when studying a hypothesis’ validity. This bad
news’ arrival is public and exponentially distributed conditionally on the hypothesis
being invalid. The fact that the bad news’ arrival is public means that it is completely
verifiable and every observation is reported on a data base which is available to the other
scientist. This assumption is realistic as more and more journals ask for the provision of
data bases and tools used for the published study.
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At any time, she can publish a result confirming the hypothesis. There is a full
publication bias towards the hypothesis validity. This is a simplifying assumption of the
fact that results which prove a relationship between two phenomena are more likely to
be published. As soon as the result is published, she obtains a flow payoff forever, which
is consistent with Smaldino and McElreath (2016), who also study the refutation process.
If, later, the hypothesis if refuted, she suffers a flow cost forever, which is higher than the
reputation payoff obtained from publication. In that way, my model is consistent with
Petersen et al. (2014), who empirically provide evidence that a researcher’s reputation
can decrease if she publishes invalidated science. Before publication, if no bad news has
arrived yet, the researcher’s belief that the hypothesis is valid increases deterministically.
At the result’s publication time, this belief is called the “publication quality”. This
quality is increasing in the speed at which bad news arrive. Accordingly, this speed
is called the “researcher’s speed”. After publication, the researcher is no longer active
and the second scientist, the refuter (he), starts working. At any time, he chooses
between experimenting and working on an outside safe option. In this way, he differs
from the researcher, who has no outside option and is enthusiastic to experiment first.
The learning process is similar to the researcher and his learning speed is called the
“refuter’s speed”. Furthermore, his bad news’ arrival is public. If he receives some bad
news, he can immediately publish his refutation of the researcher’s work and enjoy a
flow refutation payoff forever. The probability that the hypothesis is valid at some time
after publication is called the “result reliability”.
This model applies to two kinds of framework. The first one is academic competition.
Working on an empirical study, the researcher would like to prove that some hypothesis
is valid but is uncertain about it. The more she works on the data, the more she is
sure that the hypothesis is valid, if this is the case. The publication bias towards the
hypothesis validity implies that the researcher never finds in her interest to publish a
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result stating the hypothesis is invalid. Since she must report every details about the
result, she cannot falsify the result. This assumption is realistic as several journals
now require to provide data bases and tools used for a study. After the publication
of the result, another scientist might work on refuting the hypothesis if he thinks his
chances of success are high enough. The refutation work is published only if refutation
is a success, as publishing a study confirming the published result is not attractive
to journals. The second framework is drug testing. The researcher is a firm that is
interested in proving a drug’s efficiency. The hypothesis validity means that the drug
is efficient; its invalidity means that is is not or that it induces dangerous side effects.
The firm conducts an experiment on some patients whose health is evolving over time.
These experiment’s reports are public and the firm cannot cheat on it. If, at some
point, their health suddenly deteriorates, that is, if the firm receives bad news, the drug
cannot be commercialized. In this case, the firm earns no profit. Otherwise, the drug is
commercialized with some probability that it is efficient. After the drug is launched on
the market, a consumer association might study the drug’s efficiency if she thinks the
drug is probably dangerous.
In a first part, I study the strategic solution using backward induction. The “switching
quality” is the equilibrium quality level at which the refuter, becoming too pessimistic
about his refutation success, switches to the safe option. It increases with refutation
rewards and decreases with the safe option payoff. Besides, it increases with the refuter’s
speed, reflecting that information is always valuable to the refuter. Taking into account
the refuter’s strategy, I then study the equilibrium publication quality. It depends
on a threshold initial belief and a threshold refutation cost. Four cases exist: 1) The
initial belief is so high that no matter how high the refutation cost is, the researcher
immediately publishes the result and the refuter directly switches to the safe option; in
this case, none of the scientists experiment; 2) The initial belief is low but the refutation
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cost is high: in this case, the researcher fears refutation and fully deters the refuter from
experimenting: at the equilibrium, she publishes the result at the switching quality; there
is no refutation risk and the refuter switches to the safe option right after the result’s
publication; hence, initial research findings are never challenged;1 3) The initial belief is
high and the refutation cost low: the researcher does not fear refutation enough and
immediately publishes the result; then the refuter experiments during a positive amount
of time and there is a refutation risk; 4) The initial belief is low and the refutation cost
is low; in this case, refutation fear is low but at the same time the researcher is not very
optimistic when she starts experimenting: at the equilibrium, she experiments during
a positive amount of time but publishes before reaching the switching quality; there
is a refutation risk and the refuter experiments during a positive amount of time. In
the latter case, I am able to study how the equilibrium publication quality varies with
respect to the scientists’ parameters. Interestingly, the effect of refutation rewards or
the safe option payoff on the equilibrium publication quality depends on the difference
of speed between the researcher and the refuter. When the researcher is more efficient,
it decreases with refutation rewards and increases with the safe option payoff, meaning
that an increase in the switching quality decreases the publication quality. The intuition
for this result is that, as the switching quality increases, the refutation risk increases
but stays low. Hence, the researcher prefers to enjoy her publication payoff earlier, at a
lower publication quality. This result actually contradicts the literature which criticizes
the paucity of refutation remuneration, as Hamermesh (2007) stated. When the refuter
is more efficient, the equilibrium publication quality increases with refutation rewards
and decreases with the safe option payoff. In this case, as the switching quality increases,
the refutation risk is so high that the researcher prefers to publish the result later, at
1The researcher remains the only scientist to work on the hypothesis. She therefore uses entry
deterrence to discourage the refutor from experimenting. Entry deterrence, which was mostly developped
in the industrial organization literature, and more specifically by Salop (1979), occurs when a firm
invests to deter entry from a potential competitor.
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a higher publication quality. This result is in line with Hamermesh (2007). When the
scientists are equally efficient, the equilibrium publication quality does not depend on
the refutation rewards nor on the safe option payoff.
In a second part, I relax the full observability assumption, which means that the
researcher’s bad news arrival is private. In this way, I allow the researcher to fraud and
publish a result she knows to be wrong. An “informed” type denotes a researcher who
has received bad news and an “uninformed” type a researcher who has not received
any bad news yet. I look for a perfect Bayesian equibrium in pure strategies, in which
deviations from the equilibrium time are assumed to come from an informed type. An
equilibrium in pure strategy does not always exist. Due to the participation constraint
of an informed type, there exists no separating equilibrium in pure strategies. In this
way, an informed researcher always has incentives to perfectly mimick an uninformed
one by choosing the same publication time. Hence, I look for a pooling equilibrium.
At equilibrium, if the initial belief is above the switching quality, the refuter never
experiments and switches directly to the safe option. Otherwise, the refuter’s experi-
mentation span is fixed. In this way, the researcher can never prevent the refuter from
experimenting. When the refutation cost is high, the incentive constraint of an informed
type is not satisfied. Hence, there exists no pooling equilibrium in pure strategies. When
the refutation cost is low, the participation and incentive constraints for both types
are satisfied for any publication time. The pooling equilibrium which maximizes the
uninformed researcher’s payoff is to publish the result at time 0. This result suggests
that transparency is better for research quality.
Related Literature. To begin with, this chapter is in line with the economics of
science, a research field which Stephan (1996) explores in details, and more particularly
with the research process literature. Bobtcheff et al. (2017) study researchers’ incentives
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to publish their work before achieving maturity by fear of being preempted by the others.
Applied to an hypothesis’ testing, this maturity represents a small type I error. In this
way, fighting for priority deteriorates the research quality. In my model, I do not study
the impact of competition but rather the impact of refutation on publication quality.
Besides, many recent papers focus on the worrying issue of type I error. The closest paper
to this chapter is Kiri et al. (2018) in which one researcher must exert high level of effort
in order to have a certain publication quality level. One colleague then decides whether
to verify its quality. By studying Nash equilibria, they prove that incentivizing research
effort and verification activities improves the expected quality of research. In my model,
this result is similar or goes in the opposite direction depending on the difference of
speed between the two scientists. The main differences are that, in my model, improving
the expected publication quality is costly through the discounting effect and that this
quality is known by the refuter, an assumption I relax in an extension. Besides, two
other papers study how replication and refutation impact the research quality. Smaldino
and McElreath (2016) theoretically show that replication and refutation slow but do not
stop the poor research quality’s flow. They assume that both replication and refutation
are rewarded and that refutation is costly to the researcher, which is consistent with
my model. By contrast, I focus on refutation. In this way, their results go in the
same direction as mine. The second paper which studies replication is Maniadis et al.
(2014), which provides a simple model and its testing. They find that a few independent
replications dramatically increase the chances that the original finding is true. In
contrast, in my model, I study refutation incentives rather than replication ones.
On the same topic, Libgober (2018) studies the impact of transparency on research
quality. Transparency implies that no falsification is possible for researchers. He shows
that imposing full transparency when the experiment is costly does not increase the
publication quality. In my model, it increases the publication quality when experimenting
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is costless. Moreover, Yoder (2018), imposes full transparency and costly information
acquisition for the researcher. He uses the terminology “positive results” for results
which are statistically significant and “negative results” for those which are not. He
provides a Bayesian framework in which negative results should be rewarded at the
optimum so that research quality increases. In my model, I impose full transparency, as
Yoder (2018), but information acquisition is costless and there is full publication bias
towards positive result, which is a result in favor of hypothesis’ validity.
Furthermore, in the economics of science, the publication bias issue is a topic close
to this chapter. Indeed, as the literature emphasises, journals are more likely to publish
papers with statistically significant results, which creates bias towards the confirmation
of the tested hypothesis, as mentioned by Brodeur et al. (2016). Furukawa (2017)
provides a model and some evidence to explain why publication bias is socially optimal
whereas Andrews and Kasy (2019) provide econometric methods to identify publication
bias. They find that adjusting for it substantially changes the number of significant
results for economic laboratory experiments. On the other hand, this publication bias
creates incentives for the researcher to perform adaptive selection, in the sense that she
chooses which model to use, which hypothesis to test or which parameter to estimate
after seeing the data. In this chapter, this publication bias is taken into account and
results which proves the hypothesis invalidity cannot be published.
Besides, my model uses a strategic experimentation framework which Keller et
al. (2005) develop in their seminal paper. In their model, though, many players
experiment simultaneously whereas in my model, scientists experiment sequentially.
Besides, Ozdenoren et al.(2019) study a model of experimentation and learning where
the researchers share or keep private the information about the outcomes of their
experiments. They show that information sharing can lead to more experimentation
and higher welfare. In my model, I obtain similar results: the researcher experiments
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more and the publication quality is higher when transparency is imposed. Moreover,
McClellan (2017) uses an experimentation model to study FDA decision rules. In
his paper, a principal designs a mechanism to incentivize the agent’s experimentation
without monetary transfers. He shows that longer experimentation leads to more type
I error, which is due to the fact that the principal keeps incentivizing the agent to
experiment when the belief about the drug’s efficiency is low. In his model, the learning
process is Brownian and experimentation costly for the agent whereas in mine, it is a
Poisson process and experimenting is costly through the discounting effect. Besides, I
use refutation instead of a mechanism design to incentivize experimentation. Moscarini
and Smith (2001) study an experimentation framework where a decision maker has to
invest or not into costly R&D. They show that experimentation is increasing in beliefs
about the product’s quality. In my model, the latter assertion is true as the expected
researcher’s payoff increases in beliefs.
Lastly, my model is related to the persuasion literature. Di Tillio et al. (2017)
study a model in which a researcher strategically manipulates an experiment to induce
an evaluator to adopt a hypothesis. They find that in some cases, the experiment’s
manipulation benefits the evaluator. Moreover, Dur and Swank (2005) examine the
selection of information collecting agents by policy makers. They show that unbiased
advisers put highest effort in collecting information. In contrast, this chapter studies the
case of a biased researcher who can manipulate information but instead of an evaluator
taking a decision, a refuter may check the experiment’s outcomes. Unlike Di Tillio et
al. (2017), the experiment’s manipulation does not benefit the refuter. In addition,
Felgenhauer and Loerke (2017) analyze a Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender
sequentially privately experiments to provide hard evidence. They find that the receiver
obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. My
results go in the same direction in the sense that the publication quality and the re-
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searcher’s experimentation are higher under public experimentation. Finally, Henry and
Ottaviani (2019) study a model where an informer sequentially collects information
through costly research to persuade an evaluator to implement a project. They show
that giving authority to the informer is socially optimal when information acquisition is
sufficiently costly. In my model, the researcher has some power in the sense that she
is the only one to work on the hypothesis at the beginning of the game. However, her
experimentation is checked by the refuter.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, the
equilibrium of the game is analyzed and in Section 4, the effects of the parameters on
the equilibrium publication quality are studied. In Section 5, an extension is provided
where the researcher’s signal is private. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Time t ∈ [0, ∞) is continuous and the discount rate is r > 0. There exists a hypothesis
which can either be valid or invalid. The validity of the hypothesis is denoted H and its
invalidity H. Two scientists are uncertain about which event occurs and can conduct
experiments to check it. At time t = 0, they have the same initial belief that the
hypothesis is valid, p0 = P (H). They experiment sequentially.
2.1 The Researcher
The first scientist, the researcher (she), starts working at time 0. While experimenting,
she can observe for free some bad news which perfectly reveals H. This bad news’
arrival is public and exponentially distributed with parameter λR > 0 conditionally on
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H, and 0 conditionally on H.2 The fact that the bad news’ arrival is public means that
the experiment conducted by the researcher is fully transparent: every observation is
reported on a data base, which, after publication, is available to the other scientist.
At any time, the researcher can publish a result confirming H. There is a full
publication bias towards results confirming H: the researcher cannot publish a result
stating H. As soon as the result is published, she obtains a flow payoff wR > 0 forever.
3
But if, at a later point in time, the hypothesis is refuted, she suffers a flow cost cR > 0
from the refutation time onwards.4
Before publication, if no bad news has arrived yet, the researcher’s belief that the
hypothesis is valid increases deterministically. The total probability of observing no
bad news before publication time tR is p0 + (1 − p0)e−λRtR . The publication quality at
publication time tR, pR(tR), is the probability of H at the publication time, conditional
on no bad news being observed up to that time; that is:
pR(tR) = P (H| no bad news before tR) =
p0
p0 + (1 − p0)e−λRtR
. (1)
For a given publication time, this quality is increasing in λR. Accordingly, λR is
called the researcher’s speed. As λR increases, the researcher becomes more efficient at
testing the hypothesis. The publication quality is strictly increasing in the amount of
time spent experimenting. After publication, the researcher is no longer active and the
second scientist can start working.
2The private case is treated in Section V.
3Experimentation is costly for the researcher only in the sense that time is discounted. Modelling
an outside option for the researcher would complicate the analysis without changing the results. She
would exert the outside option only when she is too pessimistic at time 0 or in case of a bad news’
arrival. Consequently, when the initial belief is too low, she would switch directly to the safe option
and never publish the result. In case of publication, she would also publish the result later, at a higher
publication quality, as she has some security net in case of bad news.
4In this sense, my model is coherent with a publication payoff which would depend on the publication
quality.
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2.2 The Refuter
Once the result is published, the second scientist, the refuter (he), can start experimenting.
At any time, he has one indivisible unit of resource to allocate between refutation and
an outside safe option, which brings a flow payoff sF > 0.
5
Like the researcher, the refuter can observe for free some bad news which perfectly
reveals H. This bad news’ arrival is public and exponentially distributed with parameter
λF > 0 conditionally on H, and 0 conditionally on H. In analogy with λR, λF is called
the refuter’s speed. The fact that the signal is public means that it is verifiable. In
this way, a refuter cannot cheat by claiming he received some bad news.6 If the refuter
receives bad news, he can immediately publish his refutation of the researcher’s work
and enjoy a flow refutation payoff wF > 0 forever.
7
By Bayes’ rule, if the refuter has kept experimenting until time t, his belief that H
is valid, when no bad news has arised at time t, is:








pF (t, tR) is called the result reliability at time t when the result has been published
at time tR. For a given publication time, the result reliability is strictly increasing in t.
5There is an asymmetry between the researcher and the refuter. For the case where the researcher
has an outside option, please refer to footnote 3.
6This would be the case if the bad news’ arrival was private. Indeed, the refuter would have an
incentive to lie to enjoy the refutation payoff as soon as possible. The result reliability would be
uncertain.
7Allowing the refuter to replicate the result would have the same impact on the refuter’s exper-
imentation than his safe outside option. Indeed, the refuter would publish the replication result at
some time only if she did not receive any bad news before that time. In this way, his strategy remains
unchanged. Besides, it would complicate the researcher’s strategy without changing the results by
introducing an additional payoff in case of replication.
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Inequality (3) states that refutation is costly enough so that the researcher considers
experimenting before publishing the result, rather than always publishing the result at
time 0. Besides, it implies that if an unfrauded result is refuted, the researcher receives a
negative flow payoff wR − cR < −
r
λF
wR, that is, the overall impact of the publication on
her payoff after refutation is negative. Inequality (4) states that working on refutation
is attracting enough so that the refuter does not always choose to switch directly to
his outside safe option. It implies that a refuter which is certain of H works forever on
refutation.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of public beliefs {pt}t≥0 if no scientist observes any
signal, the refuter switches only once to the outside option and the refuter’s speed is
higher than the researcher’s speed. This evolution is Markovian with a change of regime
at tR. The probability that the hypothesis is valid increases up to the belief at which
the researcher publishes (the publication quality), then increases again up to the belief
at which the refuter switches to the outside option; after both scientists have stopped
experimenting, the result reliability remains constant.
2.3 Explanation of the difference between the scientists’ speeds
The researcher can be more or less efficient than the refuter. The former being less
efficient than the latter can reflect the term “dwarfs on the shoulder of giants”. It takes
longer for pioneers to work on a project than followers, who can benefit about the work
which has been done on it. For example, in 1994, and after more than three centuries

















Figure 1 – The evolution of belief if no scientist observes any signal and the refuter
switches only once to the outside option.
after its statement, the mathematician Andrew Wiles succeeded in proving the Fermat
theorem, even many mathematicians made progress on it in between.
By contrast, the researcher being more efficient than the refuter could reflect the well
widespread division of work. The most efficient scientists work on new ideas whereas
the least efficient ones work on old ideas, such as refutation.
3 Equilibrium Strategies
By backward induction, I start by studying the refuter’s strategy.
3.1 The Refuter’s Equilibrium Strategy
The refuter has no incentive to switch more than once from experimenting to his safe
option as his belief remains unchanged while working on the safe option and his payoffs
are discounted. His expected payoff at publication time tR, if he switches to his safe
option at time tF ≥ tR, is:
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where t̃ is the random time at which the refuter first observes bad news. This payoff is
the sum of two terms. First, with probability pR(tR), the hypothesis is valid and the
refuter never receives bad news. Thus, he keeps experimenting until reaching time tF ,
at which time he switches to the safe option and thereafter enjoys the safe payoff sF .
Second, with probability 1 − pR(tR), the hypothesis is invalid. If the refuter observes
a signal before switching to the safe option (t̃ ≤ tF ), he enjoys the refutation payoff
from there on. Otherwise (t̃ > tF ), he switches to the safe option at time tF and enjoys
thereafter the safe option payoff. Denote pR the publication quality and pF the result
reliability which are given by
pR =pR(tR),
pF =pF (tF , tR).
For each publication time tR and switching time tF , there exist a unique publication
quality pR and a unique result reliability pF . In this way, the refuter’s payoff can be
expressed as a function of pR and pF only. Hence, the refuter’s payoff can be rewritten
as:






















(1 − pF )wF
)]
I call the equilibrium quality at which the refuter switches to the safe option the
switching quality. The refuter’s equilibrium strategy is stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. The refuter’s equilibrium switching quality p∗F is:






• If pF < p∗F , the refuter keeps experimenting;
• If pF ≥ p∗F , he switches to the safe option.
Interestingly, the switching quality does not depend on the publication quality. This
is due to the Markovian evolution of belief. In this way, the refuter always ensures
that the result reliability is at least p∗F , regardless of the researcher’s strategy. If the
publication quality is already equal to or higher than the switching quality, the refuter
never experiments and switches to the safe option right after the result’s publication.
Otherwise, the refuter experiments a positive amount of time. Besides, the switching
quality increases with the refutation payoff. Indeed, as the refutation payoff increases,
the expected discounted payoff of experimenting increases. Therefore, the refuter can
afford being more optimistic and experiments longer, leading to a higher switching
quality. A similar reasoning explains why the switching quality decreases with the safe
option payoff. Moreover, this switching quality increases in the refuter’s speed. As the
refuter becomes more efficient, he can experiment more and trigger publication for a
higher belief’s threshold. Lastly, the switching quality decreases in the discount factor.
Indeed, as the discount effect becomes stronger, the refuter’s expected discounted payoff
decreases.
Besides, the refuter’s experimentation time ∆t∗, as a function of the researcher’s
publication quality, is
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For a given switching quality, it decreases in the publication quality. As a matter of
fact, as the publication quality increases, the refuter becomes more pessimistic about
his chances of success and experiments less. The effect of the scientists’ parameters on
the refuter’s experimentation time depends on their effect on the publication quality,
which will be studied in Section IV.
3.2 The Researcher’s Equilibrium Strategy
If the initial belief is above the switching quality, the researcher knows the refuter
immediately switches to the safe option. Hence, in equilibrium, she publishes the result
at time 0. Otherwise, that is, if p0 < p
∗
F , there exists a refutation risk and the researcher
faces the following trade-off. i) By publishing exactly at the switching quality, she
fully prevents the refuter from experimenting as the latter switches directly to the safe
option. In this case, she enjoys her publication payoff with no refutation risk. ii) By
publishing before reaching the switching quality, she faces a refutation risk but enjoys
her publication payoff earlier. In this case, her expected payoff at time 0 is:


















The part under brackets is the expected difference between two terms: the discounted
publication payoff and the discounted refutation cost in case the hypothesis is invalid
and refutation happens before the refuter switches to the safe option. The payoff is
discounted at time 0 and occurs only if the researcher does not observe any signal before
publication. In case she receives some bad news, her expected payoff is 0 as she cannot
publish the result. The researcher’s srategy can be expressed in terms of both the
publication quality and the switching quality only. The equilibrium publication quality
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p∗R satisfies:











































Detailed computation can be found in the appendix. This function is continuous at
p∗F . There is no closed form solution for the equilibrium publication quality, but four






















cR represents the threshold cost above which refutation is too costly for the researcher.
In this case, she fully prevents the refuter from experimenting by publishing the result at
the switching quality. The threshold p0 represents the quality at which the researcher’s
payoff starts decreasing. If the initial belief is above this threshold, experimenting before
publishing the result decreases the researcher’s payoff. In this way, the latter does not
wait and publishes the result at time 0.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium publication quality p∗R splits in four cases:
• Optimistic certain publication: if p0 ≥ p∗F , the researcher publishes at time 0, that
is, p∗R = p0;
• Pessimistic certain publication: if cR ≥ cR and p0 < p∗F , there is full deterrence of
the refuter’s experimentation, that is, p∗R = p
∗
F ;
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• Pessimistic risky publication: if cR < cR and p0 < p0, the researcher publishes
before reaching the switching quality, that is, p∗R < p
∗
F ;
• Optimistic risky publication: If cR < cR and p∗F > p0 ≥ p0, the researcher publishes
at time 0, that is, p∗R = p0.
If the initial belief is above the switching quality, the refuter never experiments
and switches directly to the safe option. There is no refutation risk and the researcher
publishes the result at time 0. This is the “optimistic certain publication”. When the
refutation cost is above the threshold, refutation risk is too costly for the researcher so
that she fully discourages the refuter from experimenting and publishes at the switching
quality: this case is called “pessimistic certain publication”. Otherwise, the refutation
risk is small and the researcher optimally chooses not to prevent the refuter from
experimenting. Her choice depends on the initial belief. If p0 is above p0, experimenting
only decreases her payoff, hence, she publishes at time 0 even if there is a refutation
risk: this is the “optimistic risky publication” case. Otherwise, that is, if the refutation
cost is below the threshold and the initial belief low, at the equilibrium, the researcher
publishes before reaching the switching quality. There exists a refutation risk. This last
case is called “pessimistic risky publication”.
These four cases are represented in the graph (cR, p0), as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2
represents the case where λR is smaller than a threshold λR defined in the appendix. In
this case, when the cost is smaller than cR, the researcher fears refutation: her tradeoff
is between publishing before reaching the switching quality, which involves a refutation
risk, or publishing at the switching quality, thus avoiding any refutation risk. If her
speed is higher than λR, p0(cR) is lower than p
∗
F . In this case, when the initial prior is
just below the switching quality, the researcher does not fear refutation enough and her
tradeoff is between publishing at time 0, with a refutation risk, and publishing at the
switching quality. Detailed computations can be found in the appendix.





















Figure 2 – The four publication cases on the graph (cR, p0)
The “optimistic certain publication” case occurs when, for instance, the researcher
obtains some of the experiment’s observations very fast and these are good enough in
favor of H to publish immediately the result. This is what is called “interim data analysis”
in research, as Landis et al. (2012) pointed out, which occurs when the analysis of the
experiment’s data is conducted before data collection has been completed. Hence, a
researcher who is very optimistic about the experiment’s result stops the experiment very
quickly and publishes a result with incomplete experiment’s observations. Interestingly,
in case of “pessimistic risky publication”, I am able to study the effect of the researcher
and refuter’s parameters on the equilibrium publication quality. The following section
focuses on this case.
4 Pessimistic Risky Publication
In this case, p0 < p0 and cR < cR. The refutation cost is relatively low, but it must
satisfy Inequality 3 in Assumption 1. I derive a necessary condition for this case to hold,
4. PESSIMISTIC RISKY PUBLICATION 45






Lemma 1. A necessary condition for the existence of the pessimistic risky publication
case is:
λF > λF . (11)
This inequality provides the existence of the optimistic risky publication case as well.
If the refuter’s speed is below this threshold, the refuter is slow in learning, leading to a
low switching quality. If the initial belief is below the switching quality, the refutation
risk exists and it is already too costly for the researcher to publish before reaching the
switching quality. If the initial belief above the switching quality, there is no refutation
risk and the researcher publishes the result at time 0. The next proposition summarizes
the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium publication quality, depending on the
scientists’ respective speeds.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium publication quality p∗R:
• decreases with the researcher’s publication payoff wR;
• increases with the researcher’s refutation cost cR;
• increases with the researcher’s speed λR;
• decreases with the refuter’s refutation payoff wF if λR > λF and increases with it
otherwise;
• increases with the refuter’s safe option payoff sF if λR > λF and decreases with it
otherwise;
• increases with the refuter’s speed λF .
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Firstly, the equilibrium publication quality is decreasing in the researcher’s pub-
lication payoff. This effect is not surprising and similar to the one I obtained in the
analyses of the refuter’s strategy. As her publication payoff increases, the expected
discounted publication payoff increases and the expected discounted cost remains the
same. As a consequence, the researcher fears less refutation and publishes at a lower
publication quality. Or, in terms of publication time, she publishes the result earlier.
In this way, the more the researcher is remunerated, the less cautious she is about the
publication quality. As a consequence, the researcher should not receive too much merit
from publishing her result. Similarly, the equilibrium publication quality increases with
the refutation cost.
Secondly, the equilibrium publication quality increases with the researcher’s speed.
As the researcher learns faster, she gains in experimenting longer to increase the amount
of evidence in favour of the hypothesis validity, thus inducing a lower refutation risk.
Hence, the equilibrium publication quality increases. Accordingly, the researcher’s
ability benefits the publication quality. The analysis in terms of publication time is
similar to Bobtcheff and Levy (2017). The researcher’s speed impacts the latter in
two ways. As the researcher becomes more efficient, the value of experimenting longer
increases. Meanwhile, she reaches a given publication quality faster. The first effect
always dominates the second one. Accordingly, the publication time increases.
Thirdly, and more surprisingly, is the interplay between the refutation payoff and
the equilibrium publication quality. This effect depends on the difference of speed
between the researcher and the refuter. As the refuter’s refutation payoff increases
or his safe option payoff decreases, at stated in Proposition 1, the switching quality
increases. When the researcher is more efficient than the refuter, the refutation threat
is weak and the refuter’s experimentation phase is poorly efficient. The researcher takes
advantage on it by publishing earlier to enjoy her publication payoff sooner. Hence,
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the equilibrium publication quality decreases. When the refuter is more efficient, the
refutation threat is strong and the researcher prefers to publish later to decrease the
refutation risk. Consequently, the equilibrium publication quality increases. When the
scientists’ speeds are equal, the increase in the expected benefit is she publishes earlier
exactly balances the decrease in the expected cost if she publishes later. Accordingly,
the equilibrium publication quality remains unchanged. As a consequence, the policy
implications are different whether the researcher is more or less efficient than the refuter.
If the researcher is more efficient, the refuter should receive low refutation rewards or
have a good outside option to benefit the publication quality. The policy implication
actually contradicts the literature which criticizes the paucity of rewards for refutation,
as mentioned by Hamermesh (2007). If the refuter is more efficient, he should receive
high refutation rewards or have a poor outside option, which goes in the same direction
as Hamermesh (2007). There is no interest in having both speeds equal as, in this case,
refutation rewards has no impact on the publication quality.
Lastly, the equilibrium publication quality is increasing in the refuter’s speed. An
increase in the refuter’s speed has two effects on the researcher’s strategy. The indirect
effect is an increase in the switching quality, which could a priori increase or decrease the
publication quality, depending on the researcher’s speed relative to the refuter’s speed.
The direct effect is that the refuter receives bad news at a higher speed, inducing a
higher refutation risk. In this way, the equilibrium publication quality increases. It turns
out that the direct effect dominates the indirect one. Hence, the equilibrium publication
quality increases. In terms of time, some result reliability level is reached faster, so the
refutation risk increases, which tends the researcher to experiment longer. The switching
quality could a priori increase or decrease the publication time. The first effect always
dominates the second one, which means that the researcher always experiments more.
In this way, the refuter’s speed always benefits the publication quality.
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In light of these results, the effect of the researcher’s parameters on the refuter’s
experimentation time can be derived through Equation 6 evaluated at t∗R. The refuter’s
experimentation time increases in the publication payoff and decreases in both the
refutation cost and the researcher’s speed. Indeed, as the publication payoff decreases, the
publication quality increases, inducing lower chances of refutation success. Consequently,
the refuter experiments less. The analysis is similar if the refutation cost or the
researcher’s speed increase. Furthermore, an increase in the refutation payoff or a
decrease in the refuter’s safe option payoff on the refuter’s equilibrium experimentation
time splits two effects. The first and direct effect is positive through the increase of the
equilibrium switching quality. The second and strategic effect depends on the evolution
of the equilibrium publication quality. If the researcher is more efficient than the refuter,
the equilibrium publication quality decreases. Accordingly, the strategic effect is positive
and the refuter’s equilibrium experimentation time increases. When the refuter is more
efficient, the equilibrium publication quality increases. In this way, the strategic effect
is negative and the total impact on the refuter’s equilibrium experimentation time is
uncertain. At last, the impact of the refuter’s speed on the refuter’s experimentation
time is less clear than the latter impacts. In addition to the direct effect (through the
switching quality) and the strategic effect (through the publication quality), there exists
a third direct effect. As the refuter becomes more efficient, the refuter experiments less
to reach some threshold. Consequently, the third effect is negative. The overall impact
on the refuter’s equilibrium experimentation time is unclear.
5 Unknown Publication Quality
In this section, the researcher’s learning process is assumed to be private: she does
not have to publicly report every observation of the experiment. In this way, she has
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an incentive to fraud by hiding the signal’s arrival to publish her result and enjoy the
publication payoff. Consequently, the publication quality is uncertain for the refuter.
Lying is not costly for the researcher. A researcher who has not received any bad news
before publication is called an uninformed type and one who has received an informed
type. I look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each type
publishes at a unique time. I assume that if the researcher deviates, the refuter believes
she is an informed type.8 In this case, he works forever on refutation.
If a separating equilibrium exists, the participation constraint of an informed type
should be satisfied. Due to Inequality 3, it is too costly for an informed type, who is
perfectly identified by the refuter, to publish. Hence, her participation constraint is
never satisfied. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2. There exists no separating equilibrium in pure strategies.
The informed type has always interest in deviating to mimick an uninformed type. I
therefore look for a pooling equilibrium in pure strategies.
5.1 The refuter’s pooling equilibrium strategy
As the publication quality is uncertain, the refuter has no additional information
compared to time 0. Let tR and tF be, respectively, the publication time and the
refuter’s switching time. By backward induction, the refuter maximizes his expected
payoff at time 0:



















8This assumption is more restrictive than if the refuter believes a deviation is made by an uninformed
type. If it was the case, both types would have more incentives to deviate and an equilibrium would
exist under narrowed conditions.
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His payoff is similar to Equation (5), but with a different starting belief. In the baseline
model, there is a learning effect through the researcher’s experimentation. Hence, the
publication quality, pR(tR), is used as a starting belief. By contrast, here, there is no
learning and the starting belief is p0. Furthermore, in the baseline model, the equilibrium
switching quality does not depend on the publication quality. As a consequence, in this
extension, the switching quality remains the same and does not depend on p0.
Proposition 4. The refuter’s strategy is the following:
• If p0 ≥ p∗F , the refuter does not experiment and switches to the safe option right
after the result’s publication;
• If p0 < p∗F , the refuter experiments during a fixed amount of time ∆t∗∗ with













If the initial belief is higher than the switching quality, there is no refutation risk
and the researcher publishes the result at time 0. If the initial belief is lower than the
switching quality, the refuter experiments during the time needed to reach the switching
quality, starting from the initial belief. It is interesting to note the difference between
the equilibrium refuter’s experimentation times in the baseline model (Equation 6) and
in this extension is the starting belief, which is p0 instead of pR. In this extension, the
refutation risk does not depend on the publication quality. It implies that the researcher
cannot prevent the refuter from experimenting, in contrast to the baseline model.
5.2 The researcher’s pooling equilibrium strategy
If the initial belief is above the switching quality, there is no refutation risk. Consequently,
the researcher publishes at time 0. This is the “optimistic certain publication” case.
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Otherwise, a pooling equilibrium with publication time tR must satisfy the participa-
tion and incentive constraints for an informed type, who has received bad news before
























W iR(tR) ≥ 0,
W iR(tR) ≥ W iR(t), ∀t 6= tR,
W uR(tR) ≥ 0,
W uR(tR) ≥ W uR(t), ∀t 6= tR,
where
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If an informed type deviates, the refuter knows that the latter has received bad news
and works forever on refutation. Due to Inequality (3), her payoff in this case, W iR(t), is
always negative, so that if the participation constraint of an informed type is satisfied,
so is her incentive constraint. The former is satisfied as long as cR is lower than some
















If the refutation cost is above this threshold, it is too costly for an informed type to
mimick an uninformed type. Hence, in this case, there exists no pooling equilibrium. If
the refutation cost is below the threshold, the informed type’s constraints are satisfied
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for any tR ∈ R+.
The participation and incentive constraints for an uninformed type are always
satisfied for cR ≥ ĉR. Consequently, a pooling equilibrium exists for any tR ∈ R+.
As the payoff for an uninformed researcher decreases in tR, the pooling equilibrium
which maximizes the uninformed researcher’s payoff is tR = 0. This corresponds to the
“optimistic risky publication” case.
Proposition 5. When cR > ĉR, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies. Otherwise,
there exists an infinity of pooling equilibria. The pooling equilibrium which maximizes
the uninformed researcher’s payoff is the one where the researcher always publishes the
result at time 0.
The pooling equilibrium which maximizes the uninformed researcher’s payoff is
represented on the graph (p0, cR) in Figure 3. p̂0(cR) represents the initial belief for
which the threshold cost ĉR is achieved, that is, p̂0 solves the equation ĉ
−1
R (p0) = p̂0.
In this pooling equilibrium, the publication quality is always equal to the initial belief.
Interestingly, the publication quality is greater in the baseline model, suggesting that













no pure strategy equilibrium
optimistic risky
publication
Figure 3 – The pooling equilibrium on the graph (cR, p0) where the uninformed researcher
maximizes her payoff
6 Conclusion
Many studies have been devoted to replication and refutation but the impact of refu-
tation’s rewards on the publication quality has not been specifically analyzed. In this
paper, I prove that the effect of refutation rewards on the publication quality depends
on the difference of speed between the researcher and the refuter. If the researcher
is more efficient, the effect is negative, which contradicts the literature’s main policy
recommendation, as Hamermesh (2007) stated. If the refuter is more efficient, the
effect is positive, which is in line with Hamermesh (2007). I also give other policy
recommendation regarding the researcher and the refuter’s incentives. Interestingly,
transparency always increases the publication quality in my model. To go further, it
would be interesting to empirically test whether my theoretical predictions are confirmed
in reality. For instance, one could use the number of citations as a measure of the
publication quality, as Petersen et al. (2014) do. The researcher’s publication payoff
and refutation cost would be the impacts of the publication and the refutation on her
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total number of citations. An interesting topic for future research would be to analyze
the journals’ incentives to publish refutation results.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The refuter’s expected payoff at publication time tR is:
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Hence, I have



















































































(1 − pF )wF
)]
.
The switching quality p∗F is such that
p∗F = arg max
pF ∈[pR,1]
W̃F (pR, pF )





Details for Equation 8
∀tR ≤ tF ,
WR(tR, tF ) =e
−rtR
(







































(1 − e−(r+λF )(tF −tR))
]
.
As for the refuter’s payoff, the researcher’s payoff can be expressed as a function of pR
and pF , which is, for all pR ≤ p∗F ,




































































Proof of Proposition 2
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There are two cases: either λR > λF or λR ≤ λF .
1. λR > λF : f







For small values of X, f ′ is positive and for large values of X, f ′ is negative.




, taking possibly positive values.








Hence, for small values of X, f is positive and for large values of X, f is negative.









= rwR + (r + λR)X
∗





rwR + λR(1 − p∗F )(wR − cR)
)
,

















wR. The different cases are:
1. If cR ≥ cR, i.e. f(X∗F ) < 0, then for every X higher than X∗F , f is always negative.
VR is decreasing on [X
∗
F , +∞). In other words, WR is increasing on (0, p∗F ].
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F ) and the researcher
publishes immediately at time 0, i.e. p∗R = p0;
2. If cR < cR, i.e. f(X
∗




F such that f(X
∗
R) = 0;
f is positive on [X∗F , X
∗
R) and negative on [X
∗
R, +∞). VR increases on [X∗F , X∗R)
and decreases on [X∗R, +∞). In other words, ˜̃WR is increasing on (0, m(X∗R)] and
decreasing on (m(X∗R), p
∗
F ].












˜̃WR(p0) and the researcher publishes at
time 0, i.e. p∗R = p0.
Details of Figure 2
The equilibrium switching quality p∗F does not depend on the refutation cost cR and
the refutation cost’s threshold cR does not depend on p0, the initial belief. However, the
threshold cost cR depends on the initial belief through the equality
˜̃W ′(p0) = 0. It is
easier to analyze the cost in terms of the initial belief, which is:




























F ) = cR.
1. If λR ≤ λF , it is obvious that cR is increasing in p0.
2. If λR > λF , then the monotonicity of cR has to be proven.
∀p0 ∈ [0, p∗F ],
c′R(p0) =
r(r + λF )wR
[















λF (1 − p0)2
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g(.) is decreasing in p0. Hence, its minimum is achieved at p
∗
F .
g(p∗F ) = λ
2
F (r + λR) − (λR − λF )
(















− (λR − λF )(r + λF )
= λF (2λF − r
wF − sF
sF
) − 2λR(r + λF ) < 0.
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Hence, g(p∗F ) decreases in λR. Moreover,
lim
λR→+∞
g(p∗F ) = −∞,
lim
λR→λF
g(p∗F ) = λ
2
F (r + λF ) > 0.
Consequently, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a λR in (λF , +∞) such
that g(p∗F ) is positive for λR in (λF , λR] and negative for λR in (λR, +∞). Hence, for
λR in (λF , λR], c
′
R(p0) is positive for all p0 in [0, p
∗
F ], meaning that cR(.) is increasing
in p0 on [0, p
∗
F ]. Otherwise, for λR in (λR, +∞), c′R(p0) is positive then negative for p0
in [0, p∗F ], meaning that cR(.) is increasing then decreasing on [0, p
∗
F ]. On Figure 2 is
represented the case where λR belongs to (λF , λR].
Proof of Lemma 1




























Proof of Proposition 3
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R) decrease in cR. X
∗
R
decreases in cR. As a consequence, p
∗
R increases in cR.




















is always negative. p∗R increases in cR.
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> 0. Define, for X ∈ [X∗F , +∞),










λF wF − (r + λF )sF
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(λ3F − λRr2 + λ2F (r − 2λR) + rλF (r − 2λR))wF − (r + λF )(λ2F − 2λF λR − rλR)sF
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=X−1(r + λF )
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λF + r(λF − λR)
)
.
h′ is clearly decreasing in X, hence, it achieves its maximum at X∗F . For all X in
[X∗F , +∞),





(r + λF )
2λR
≤ 0.
Hence, h decreases in X and achieves its maximum at X∗F .




















= −(λF − λR)
r2sF cR(wF − sF )
λF (λF wF − (r + λF )sF )2
< 0.
Hence, f(X∗R) and V
′(X∗R) decrease in λF . X
∗
R decreases in λF . Consequently, p
∗
R
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increases in λF when λR ≤ λF .
• When λR > λF , as X∗R decreases in λR, it achieves its lower bound at λF . Denote
X∗R this lower bound. It is defined as
lim
λR→λF
f(X∗R) = 0 ⇔ X∗R =
rwR
















In the pessimistic risky case, cR < cR. When λR tends to λF , it is equivalent




F . Hence, the right part of
the inequality is negative, which implies that h(X∗R) is always negative. In this
way, f(X∗R) and V
′(X∗R) decrease in λF . X
∗
R decreases in λF . Consequently, p
∗
R
increases in λF when λR > λF .










=(λR − λF )cR
r2sF

















R) increase in wF , hence, X
∗
R
increases in wF and p
∗
R decreases in wF . Otherwise, which is if λR ≤ λF , p∗R increases in
wF .
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R) decrease in sF , hence, X
∗
R
decreases in sF and p
∗
R increases in sF . Otherwise, which is if λR ≤ λF , p∗R decreases in sF .
Proof of Lemma 2











































This participation constraint is never satisfied under Assumption 1. Hence, there exists
no separating equlibrium in pure strategies.
Proof of Proposition 4
The refuter’s payoff is:




























er(tF −tR) − e−λF (tF −tR)
)]
.
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Taking the first order condition with respect to tF , I obtain the refuter’s equilibrium
experimentation time ∆t∗∗:






















λF wF − (r + λF )sF
rsF
)











, the refuter never experiments and
switches directly to the safe option.
Proof of Proposition 5
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W iR(tR) = e































W iR(t) = e
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−rtR
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−rt
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Due to Inequality (3), W iR(t) is always negative. Hence, the incentive constraint of
















If cR > ĉR, the participation constraint of an informed type is never satisfied. Conse-
quently, there exists no pooling equilibrium. If cR ≤ ĉR, the participation constraint of
an informed type is satisfied for any tR ∈ R+. The participation and incentive constraints
for an uninformed type are always satisfied for cR ≤ ĉR. Hence, a pooling equilibrium
exists for any tR ∈ R+. Besides, the payoff for an uninformed researcher decreases in tR.
Hence, the pooling equilibrium which maximizes the uninformed researcher’s payoff is
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tR = 0.
Details of Figure 3
The threshold p∗F does not depend on the refutation cost cR. From Equation 12, ĉR
is clearly increasing in p0. Moreover, ĉR is equal to
r + λF
λF
wR when the initial belief is
0 and tends to infinity when the initial belief tends to the switching quality.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 69
Bibliography
Andrews, Isaiah and Maximilian Kasy (2019) “Identification of and correction for
publication bias,” American Economic Review, 109 (8), 2766–94.
Begley, C. Glenn and Lee M. Ellis (2012) “Drug development: Raise standards for
preclinical cancer research,” Nature, 483 (7391), 531–533.
Bobtcheff, Catherine, Jérôme Bolte, and Thomas Mariotti (2017) “Researcher’s dilemma,”
The Review of Economic Studies, 84 (3), 969–1014.
Bobtcheff, Catherine and Raphaël Levy (2017) “More haste, less speed? Signaling
through investment timing,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9 (3),
148–86.
Brodeur, Abel, Mathias Le, Marc Sangnier, and Yanos Zylberberg (2016) “Star wars:
The empirics strike back,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8 (1),
1–32.
Davis, Courtney, Huseyin Naci, Evrim Gurpinar, Elita Poplavska, Ashlyn Pinto, and
Ajay Aggarwal (2017) “Availability of evidence of benefits on overall survival and
quality of life of cancer drugs approved by European Medicines Agency: retrospective
cohort study of drug approvals 2009-13,” The British Medical Journal, 359, j4530.
Di Tillio, Alfredo, Marco Ottaviani, and Peter Norman Sorensen (2017) “Persuasion
bias in science: can economics help?” The Economic Journal, 127 (605), F266–F304.
Dur, Robert and Otto H. Swank (2005) “Producing and manipulating information,” The
Economic Journal, 115 (500), 185–199.
Felgenhauer, Mike and Petra Loerke (2017) “Bayesian persuasion with private experi-
mentation,” International Economic Review, 58 (3), 829–856.
70
Freedman, Leonard P., Iain M. Cockburn, and Timothy S. Simcoe (2015) “The economics
of reproducibility in preclinical research,” PLoS biology, 13 (6), e1002165.
Furukawa, Chishio (2017) “Unbiased publication bias: Theory and evidence,” Unpub-
lished Manuscript.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. (2007) “Replication in economics,” Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 40 (3), 715–733.
Henry, Emeric and Marco Ottaviani (2019) “Research and the approval process: the
organization of persuasion,” American Economic Review, 109 (3), 911–55.
Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun C, Georgios Katsenos, and Emre Ozdenoren (2019) “Experi-
mentation, Learning, and Preemption,” Available at SSRN 3321231.
Humphreys, Macartan (2015) “What has been learned from the deworming replica-
tions: a nonpartisan view,” Columbia University, Aug. http://www. columbia. edu/˜
mh2245/w/worms. html.
Ioannidis, John P.A. (2005a) “Why most published research findings are false,” PLoS
medicine, 2 (8), e124.
(2005b) “Contradicted and initially stronger effects in highly cited clinical
research,” Jama, 294 (2), 218–228.
Keller, Godfrey, Sven Rady, and Martin Cripps (2005) “Strategic experimentation with
exponential bandits,” Econometrica, 73 (1), 39–68.
Kiri, Bralind, Nicola Lacetera, and Lorenzo Zirulia (2018) “Above a swamp: A theory
of high-quality scientific production,” Research Policy, 47 (5), 827–839.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 71
Landis, Story C., Susan G. Amara, Khusru Asadullah, Chris P. Austin, Robi Blumenstein,
Eileen W. Bradley, Ronald G. Crystal, Robert B. Darnell, Robert J. Ferrante, Howard
Fillit et al. (2012) “A call for transparent reporting to optimize the predictive value
of preclinical research,” Nature, 490 (7419), 187–191.
Libgober, Jonathan (2018) “False Positives and Transparency in Scientific Research,”
Available at SSRN 2617130.
Maniadis, Zacharias, Fabio Tufano, and John A. List (2014) “One swallow doesn’t make
a summer: New evidence on anchoring effects,” American Economic Review, 104 (1),
277–90.
McClellan, Andrew (2017) “Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms,” working paper.
Moscarini, Giuseppe and Lones Smith (2001) “The optimal level of experimentation,”
Econometrica, 69 (6), 1629–1644.
Mueller-Langer, Frank, Benedikt Fecher, Dietmar Harhoff, and Gert G. Wagner (2019)
“Replication studies in economics—How many and which papers are chosen for repli-
cation, and why?” Research Policy, 48 (1), 62–83.
Open Science Collaboration (2015) “Estimating the reproducibility of psychological
science,” Science, 349 (6251), aac4716.
Petersen, Alexander Michael, Santo Fortunato, Raj K. Pan, Kimmo Kaski, Orion Penner,
Armando Rungi, Massimo Riccaboni, H. Eugene Stanley, and Fabio Pammolli (2014)
“Reputation and impact in academic careers,” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 111 (43), 15316–15321.
Salop, Steven C. (1979) “Strategic entry deterrence,” The American Economic Review,
69 (2), 335–338.
72
Smaldino, Paul E. and Richard McElreath (2016) “The natural selection of bad science,”
Royal Society Open Science, 3 (9), 160384.
Stephan, Paula E. (1996) “The economics of science,” Journal of Economic literature,
34 (3), 1199–1235.
The Economist (2013) “Unreliable research: Trouble at the lab,” Economist.




74 CHAPTER 1. REFUTATION IN RESEARCH
Chapter 2
Citizen science vs. traditional
science:
the speed/quality trade-off
Abstract I examine the tradeoff of the scientist who has access to citizen science
(CS) or traditional science (TS) to undertake her research. A sequence of projects are
successively available on a discrete time horizon. Each project is a public good with
some value. For each project, a scientist (she) chooses to implement it with CS or
TS. With TS, she implements the project for sure but it takes one period. With CS,
the project is implemented immediately with the help of two citizens. However, its
success is uncertain and depends on the citizens’ actions. When the successive projects
have the same value, the scientist’s strategy is a cut-off: when the value of the project
is above some threshold, she uses CS. Below this threshold, she uses TS. This result
is generalized to any sequence of project values which satisfies the Markov property.
In an extension, two scientists compete to attract citizens on their project. Focusing
on stationnary Markovian equilibria, I show that the equilibrium in pure strategies
75
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is unique: for sufficiently high project values, both scientists always choose CS. For
sufficiently low values, both scientists always choose TS. In both cases, there exist no
equilibrium in mixed strategies. For intermediate project values, the unique equilibrium
is in mixed strategies: if one scientist is stuck with choosing TS at the former period,
the other one always chooses CS. Otherwise, they both mix between TS and CS.
Keywords: citizen science, repeated game, tradeoff of the scientist.
JEL codes: C73, 031, 036.
1 Introduction
There is growing interest in citizen science, a form of science to be distinguished from
traditional science. Also called “crowd science” or “crowdsourcing”, it democratizes
science by involving citizens to implement various kinds of projects, as Franzoni and
Sauermann (2014) analyze. As reported by Koeze and Popper (2020), the covid-19 crisis
has emphasized the importance of connectivity, which plays a key role in citizen science.
For instance, the FoldIt project, launched in 2008, enables citizens to contribute to a
science project through an online game in which they fold proteins to understand their
structure. In 2010, it already gathered 200 000 players. Since last March, the game has
proposed to look for the protein which will neutralize the covid-19. In another project
called Galaxy Zoo, launched in 2007, citizens treat galaxies data in order to report
dust particules, a task which can not be done even by highly performing computers.
The success of this project led to the creation of a online platform in which volunteers
have the choice to contribute to various kinds of citizen science projects. In that way,
citizen science contributes largely to the collection of important data. In this respect,
Poisson et al. (2020) shows that the contribution of the citizens provided over half of
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the observations for commonly sampled water-quality measures worldwide from the
past 31 years, and also contributed to the majority of long-term monitoring for selected
measures in lakes. Moreover, as stated by Lukyanenko et al. (2016), “because citizens
generally lack formal scientific training, they view problems and issues in light of their
own knowledge and interests, creating fertile ground for discoveries”.
Besides, citizen science is a powerful tool to raise awareness on major scientific
concerns. Kullenberg and Kasperowski (2016) indicates that there are three citizen
science fields of research. The first and largest is research on biology, conservation
and ecology, and utilizes citizen science mainly as a methodology of collecting and
classifying data. Taking the example of migratory birds and climate change, Cooper
et al. (2014) find that papers based on citizen science constituted between 24% and
77% of the references backing each claim, with no evidence of a mistrust of claims that
relied heavily on citizen-science data. Concerning biodiversity research, Theobald et
al. (2015) estimate that 1.3–2.3 million volunteers contribute $667 million–$2.5 billion
in-kind annually. This gives a tool to understand the crucial impact of citizen science
on public expenses. The second field is geographic information research, where citizens
participate in the collection of geographic data. The third one is research on social
sciences and epidemiology, which studies and facilitates public participation in relation
to environmental issues and health. For example, Mahajan et al. (2020) shows that using
it through online quizz can generate insightful data which can assist in understanding
people’s perception and exposure levels to air pollution.
Nevertheless, the quality of science made using citizen science is questionable as it
involves non-experts, as underlined by Lukyanenko et al. (2016). It should be considered
carefully. Indeed, Prestopnik et al. (2017) underline the importance of games to motivate
participants, but cheating should be controlled for. In short, crowd science can be very
useful to achieve projects in a surprinsingly short amount of time. Numerous citizen
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science projects share the same features: 1) a high number of volunteers participate
to each project; 2) it enables scientists to implement projects which would have taken
years otherwise; 3) each project is a public good which is privately implemented by the
volunteers and 4) the quality of the project’s outcomes is questionable. As reported by
Rowland (2012), Francois Taddei, a molecular geneticist at the Centre for Research and
Interdisciplinarity at Paris Descartes University, suggests that a solution to the worrying
quality of citizen science projects may be to develop a “science of citizen science”. More
specifically, researchers will need to figure out the optimal division of labour between
citizens and professionals.
To meet these goals, I build a theoretical model to better understand the mechanisms
behind citizen science. There exists an infinite number of scientific projects successively
available. Each project is a public good, which means that every player enjoys its
value, which is called “the project value”. There are three players, one scientist and
two citizens. For each project, the scientist (she) has the choice between using citizen
science (CS) or traditional science (TS) to implement it. By using TS, she works by
herself on the project and does not require the help of the citizens. To implement the
project, she needs one period of time and the next project is available only two periods
after. By using CS, the scientist makes the citizens work to implement the project at the
current period, but its success depends on the actions of the citizens. The next project
is available only one period after. To use CS, the scientist must pay a fixed cost, which
is called “the CS cost”. This cost represents the cost of making the project available to
citizens online. The creation of a platform through which citizens can contribute always
represents a sunk cost for the scientist. Taking the example of FoldIt, designing the
game through which citizens contribute to the project is costly. The CS cost can also
represent the cost of sharing data. Indeed, these data are sometimes hard to obtain and
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making it public is a sunk cost for the scientist.
The citizens only work if the scientist has chosen CS for the current period’s project.
Each one chooses to exert effort or not. The effort cost is privately observed by each
citizen and depends on his motivation. If he is motivated, then effort is costless. If he is
not motivated, then effort is costly. The probability of implementing the project depends
on how many citizens exerted effort. If no one exerts effort, then the project is not
implemented. If only one exerts effort, then it is implemented with some probability. If
both exert effort, it is implemented with a higher probability. In any case, the quality of
the project is lower with CS. To simplify the analysis, I assume that the non-motivated
citizen never exerts effort, which implies that there exists only one citizens’ Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
In a first part, I analyze the deterministic benchmark, in which each project has the
same value. By backward induction, I first look at the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
citizens. Due to the assumption discussed above, the equilibrium is unique: a motivated
citizen always exerts effort and a non-motivated one never exerts effort. The ex-ante
probability that the project is implemented is called “the CS quality”. Turning to the
scientist, her payoff is linear in the scientist’s choice and does not involve a state variable.
It implies that her choice is constant and follows a cut-off rule. If the project value
is above the cut-off, the scientist chooses CS and if it is below, she chooses TS. This
cut-off decreases with the CS quality and increases with the CS cost and the discount
factor, which is quite intuitive. Indeed, if the CS quality decreases, the discount factor
increases or the CS cost increases, TS becomes an attractive option and the scientist
chooses TS for higher project values.
Then, I generalize the deterministic benchmark by applying the model to any sequence
of project values which satisfies the Markov property. Using recursive techniques (Stokey
and Lucas, 1989), I show that there always exists a cut-off for the project value, above
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which the scientist uses CS and below which she uses TS to implement the project.
In an extension, instead of one scientist, two scientists compete to attract citizens.
By contrast with the monopolist case, projects are not public goods: one scientist does
not benefit from the implementation of the project of the other scientist. The probability
to attract citizens is a modified Tullock function with a minimal CS cost to pay. This
function is well suited to my model as it increases with the CS cost of one scientist
and decreases with the CS cost of the other scientist. By contrast with the monopolist
case, the cost represents the effort that one scientist should make to attract citizens
and cannot be recovered for the loser of the contest. The benefit coming from the
implementation of the project is random. By backward induction, the strategies of the
citizens remain unchanged. Then looking at the strategies of the scientists, I restrain
the analysis to Markovian equilibria, that is, equilibria in which at every period, each
scientist chooses always the same CS cost. The Markovian state variable is the scientist’s
current project value. It means that scientists cannot adopt repeated strategies like
punishment phases. It implies that both scientists choose the same CS cost every time
they both choose CS. Besides, they have equal probability to attract the two citizens
on their project. The “simplest” Markovian equilibrium to look at is the stationary
equilibrium, in which each scientist makes the same choice at every period.
In this stationary Markovian equilibrium, a scientist is “constrained” if she has
chosen TS for the former period’s project, meaning that she has no choice to make
at the current period. A scientist is “not constrained” if she has chosen CS at the
former period, meaning that a new project is available for her at the current period.
The analysis starts by fixing the strategy of one scientist and looking at a profitable
deviation for the other one. The latter has two types of choice to make. The first type
occurs when the other scientist is constrained, which implies that she is a monopolist to
attract citizens. The second type of choice occurs when the other one is not constrained,
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which implies that they compete to attract citizens.
There exist three kinds of outcomes. In the first one, both scientists choose TS. In
the two remaining outcomes, both scientists choose CS, with the equilibrium CS being
equal to the minimum in one case and a higher one in the second case. The cut-off
project value to use TS is the same as the monopolist case as the continuation value from
choosing TS remains the same. The cut-off to use CS is similar but scientists compete
so the CS quality is multiplied by one half. Besides, the monopolist CS cost is replaced
by the equilibrium CS cost of the static Nash game played by scientists. Interestingly,
there exists no equilibrium in which a scientist chooses CS if both are not constrained
and TS if only the other one is constrained. Also, there exists no equilibrium in which
one chooses TS if both are not constrained and CS if only the other one is constrained.
This comes from the fact that choosing CS in one case implies that the project value
must be sufficiently high and at the same time, choosing TS in the other case implies
that it must be sufficiently low. These two conditions cannot hold at the same time
for these two kinds of equilibria. By contrast with the monopolist case, there exist two
sources of inefficiencies. The first one is that when both scientists always choose CS and
the equilibrium CS cost is higher than the minimum, they pay an extra CS cost. The
second one is that the chance to win the contest is only a half, implying that project
value threshold to choose CS is higher. In that way, there exists no equilibrium in pure
strategies when the project value lies between the TS threshold and the CS threshold.
Turning to mixed strategies, a unique symmetric equilibrium exists only in the range
of project values where no equilibrium in pure strategies exists. In this equilibrium, a
scientist always chooses CS when the other one is constrained and scientists mix between
TS and CS when both are not constrained. Similarly as the analysis of equilibria in
pure strategies, no other type of equilibrium in mixed strategies exists. To conclude the
analysis, two sources of randomness appear in this mixed strategies equilibrium. The
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first one comes from the winner-takes-all contest to attract citizens. The loser pays the
sunk CS cost and does not implement her project at all. The second one comes from
mixing between CS and TS when both scientists are not constrained. The benefit of
randomly picking CS when the other scientist picks TS implies that the scientist pays
the minimal CS cost over two periods, thus enjoying the monopolist position longer. In
this way, a persistence effect is engendered.
Related Literature This chapter is related to the private provision of public good
field, which Bergstrom et al. (1986) explore in detail in their seminal paper. They study
a model in which the citizens contribute in a non-cooperative way to the provision of a
public good. They show that there exists in general a unique Nash equilibrium. In my
model, in addition, each citizen does not know the other one’s type. Consequently, I look
for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show with an experiment
that citizens always have sufficient incentives to voluntarily achieve the Pareto efficient
outcome. In this chapter, I introduce a probability of providing the public good which
depends on the effort exerted by both citizens. In this way, the Pareto efficient outcome,
which would be that both citizens exert effort, is not implemented. Moreover, my
modeling of citizens’ game is similar to Varian (2004), which compares three different
technologies for the probability of implementing the project. In my model, I rather keep
a general modeling of this probability to focus on the scientist’s tradeoff.
Besides, my model is in line with the research process literature, an economic field
which focuses on the scientist’s work. Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2010) builds a model
of scientific progress in which scientists decide to work on an old paradigm or to create
a new one. Furthermore, Garfagnini and Strulovici (2012) emphasize the trade-off
between marginal innovation and radical innovation to measure the intergenerational
accumulation of knowledge. By contrast, in my model, the scientist trades off between
traditional science and citizen science to work on a new project. In addition, I focus on
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the probability of implementing a project rather than on the accumulation of knowledge
created by all the projects implemented.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the citizen science literature. In this respect,
Watson and Floridi (2016) emphasizes the powerful epistemic advantages of citizen
science over more traditional modes of scientific investigation. I model these advantages
with the researcher going faster by choosing citizen science. Besides, Nov et al. (2014)
investigate effects of motivational factors on the quantity and quality of citizen scientists’
contribution. They show that citizens’ contributions are determined by collective motives,
norm-oriented motives, reputation, and intrinsic motives, and that contribution quality
is positively affected only by collective motives and reputation. In my model, I suppose
that the quality of the citizen science project depends on the quantity of contribution
made by the citizens. Interestingly, Laut et al. (2017) underline that citizen science
projects often rely on only a small fraction of participants to make the majority of
contributions. To illustrate this fact, in my model, I suppose that there are only two
citizens. They analyze the impact of including virtual peers to citizen science projects on
the citizens contribution. They found that when virtual peers systematically outperform
the participants, their contribution increases fourfold. In my model, when the two
citizens are motivated, the quality of the outcome is higher.
A close paper to this chapter is Bernard (2020). This paper also analyzes the
researchers’ tradeoff between CS and TS. At the time at which one of the researchers
discovers a new idea/project, she chooses between CS, which brings a certain payoff,
and TS. By contrast with this chapter, the researcher who uses TS chooses the time
at which she publishes her idea. The more the idea mature, the higher her payoff.
However, she faces potential competition from her opponent as they fight for priority.
In this way, Bernard (2020) studies a model in which scientists compete when using CS
but not TS and this chapter studies a model in which they compete using TS but not CS.
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section II explains the model. In Section III,
the deterministic benchmark is analyzed and in Section IV generalizes the result of
Section III. In Section V, an extension is provided where 2 scientists compete to attract
citizens. Section VI concludes.
2 The Model
Time is denoted t ∈ N∗ and discounted at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). There exists an infinite number
of scientific projects, which are successively available. Each project is a public good, so
that if the nth project is implemented, each player enjoys its value vn > 0. If the project
is not implemented, each player gets no payoff. There exist three players, one scientist
and two citizens.
2.1 The scientist
If a project is available at date t, the scientist (she) has the choice between using citizen
science (CS) or traditional science (TS) to implement it. If she uses TS, she works alone
on the project and the latter is implemented at date t + 1. The next project can only be
available at date t + 2. If she chooses CS, she requires the citizens’ help to complete the
project. The latter is implemented at the current period, that is, at date t, but there is
some probability that the project fails, depending on the citizens’ actions. In this case,
every player gets 0 and the project can never be implemented. Besides, after having
observed the current project value, the scientist must pay a cost cinf > 0 to make the
project available to citizens. This cost is called the CS cost. By using CS, the next
project is available at date t + 1. I assume that if the scientist is indifferent between CS
and TS for one project, then she always chooses CS.
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2.2 The citizens
If the scientist chooses CS for the project available at date t, then citizens work. A
citizen (he) may be motivated with probability α ∈ (0, 1), or not (with probability
1 − α). Each citizen j ∈ {1, 2} chooses to exert effort (E) or not (NE). Exerting effort
costs e > 0 for a non-motivated citizen and 0 for a motivated one. Each citizen faces a
double uncertainty: he does not know whether the other one is motivated and if the
latter exerts effort or not. The probability of implementing the project, Pm, depends on
how many citizens exert effort. If both exert effort, the project is implemented with
probability P2 ∈ (0, 1]. If only one exerts effort, it is implemented with probability
P1 ∈ (0, P2). If none exerts effort, the project is implemented with probability P0 = 0.
Assumption 1.
∀n ∈ N∗, e > (P2 − P1)vn. (1)
Inequality 1 means that a non-motivated citizen never exerts effort for the nth project,
even if the other does.
3 The deterministic benchmark
Each project has the same value v > 0. By backward induction, I start by studying the
strategies of the citizens.
3.1 The citizens’ Bayesian Nash equilibrium
I look for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Denote e−j the effort cost of citizen −j. If
citizen j is motivated, he faces the following game:
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j −j E NE
E P2v , P2v − e−j P1v , P1v
NE P1v , P1v − e−j 0 , 0
As effort is costless for a motivated citizen, it is always a dominant strategy for him
to exert effort. If citizen j is not motivated, he faces the following game:
j −j E NE
E P2v − e , P2v − e−j P1v − e , P1v
NE P1v , P1v − e−j 0 , 0
Due to Inequality 1, it is always a dominant strategy for a non-motivated citizen
not to exert effort. The analysis remains the same for citizen −j. This leads to the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique: a motivated citizen always exerts
effort and a non-motivated one never exerts effort.
This Lemma implies that the ex-ante probability that the project is implemented is:
P(project is implemented) = E[Pm] = α
2P2 + 2α(1 − α)P1 = fα. (2)
In what follows, fα is called the CS quality. The CS quality is always lower than TS
quality, that always equals 1 (the project never fails).
3.2 The tradeoff of the scientist
By choosing CS, the scientist’s expected payoff at date t is fαv − cinf . By choosing TS,
her expected payoff at date t is δv. The scientist’s choice for the project available at
date t is denoted kt ∈ {0, 1}. kt = 0 means that she chooses TS and kt = 1 that she
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The function to maximize is linear in k. For each k, the value function is linear in v.






















Proposition 1. The scientist uses CS for every project if v ≥ v∗(fα). Otherwise, she
uses TS.
Since CS involves a sunk cost for the scientist, she chooses this option only if the
project value is high enough. If the CS quality is below
δ
1 + δ
, the value function when
choosing CS is always lower than when choosing TS, which implies that CS is always
more costly than TS to implement the project. As a consequence, the scientist always
chooses TS. Otherwise, the scientist may choose CS, if the project value is above v∗(fα).
The threshold v∗(fα) increases with the CS cost in citizen science and the discount
factor and decreases with the CS quality. Indeed, when cinf or δ is high or when fα
is low, the citizen science’s choice becomes poorly attractive and the scientist requires
higher project values. The equilibrium choice of the scientist is represented in Figure
1. The following section generalizes the cut-off rule of the scientist to any sequence of
projects which satisfies the Markov property.









Figure 1 – The equilibrium choice of the scientist on the graph (fα, v)
4 Generalization
Suppose that every project has a value vn ∈ [v, v̄] with v̄ > v ≥ 0. Denote v the current
project value and v+ the value of the next project, which is not yet available. Suppose
that the evolution of the project values satisfies the Markov property, that is, the value of
the next project only depends on the last project value through its distribution G(v+|v),
and that this distribution is increasing in v in the FOSD sense, that is:
∀v ≥ v′, ∀v+, G(v+|v) ≤ G(v+|v′). (3)
It means that if the scientist has a low (respectively high) value for the currently available
project, she has more chances to have a low (respectively high) value for the next project
available. In this respect, there exists a persistency effect between the project which is
currently available and the one which is available just after.
The citizens’ strategy remains unchanged: a motivated citizen always exerts effort
and a non-motivated one never exerts effort. Accordingly, the CS quality remains the
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same as Equation 2. The scientist’s value function becomes:
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Inequality 3 implies that the scientist making a choice at time t has a high probability
to make the same choice for the next project available. In this way, either she chooses
CS or TS for the two projects. If the current project value is high, then she chooses
CS, and most probably CS for the next project. Otherwise, she chooses TS, and most
probably TS for the next project. By applying the contraction mapping theorem to the
scientist’s dynamic problem, the result found in Section 3 can be generalized.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique threshold v∗∗ ∈ [v, v̄] such that, for any project
available with value v:
• If v ≥ v∗∗, the scientist chooses CS;
• Otherwise, she chooses TS.
In this way, the uncertainty about the next projects outcomes is controlled by this
cut-off rule. This simple strategy is easy to implement for the scientist which has only
to care about the current project value to make her choice. In addition, this result
enables to make a research plan over several periods. In terms of policy implications,
it is important as the government can anticipate the potential subsidies to provide to
support CS.
4.1 Application to the iid case
This framework is a special case of the Markovian evolution of the projects values. The
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F and mean Ev and v̄ > v > 0. To compare with Inequality 3, the distribution F
satisfies
∀v ≥ v′, ∀v+, F (v+|v) = F (v+|v′) = F (v+).
In this respect, if the currently available project has a high value, the next project
has not necessarily a high value. No matter if the current project value is high or low,
the expected continuation payoff remains the same. The next project value plays no role
as the latter is not correlated with the currently available project value. This makes the
scientist’s choice easy as she only takes into account the current project value to make
her decision. Besides, there exists no persistence in the scientist’s strategy. Choosing
CS for the current project does not imply a high probability of choosing CS for the next
project. In terms of policy implications, this framework does not necessarily benefit the
government (he). Indeed, he cannot accurately plan how to provide funds to encourage
CS for future research projects.
Up to now, the scientist was certain to capt the two citizens attentions on her project
using CS. What happens if two scientists fight for the citizens? This is what I study in
the following Section.
5 When scientists compete to attract citizens
The evolution of the project values is deterministic and equal to v > 0. By contrast with
the monopolist case, projects are not public goods, in the sense that one scientist cannot
benefit from the implementation of the other scientist’s project. Scientists fight to attract
citizens and the loser gets 0. Scientist i has a probability p(ci, c−i) to attract citizens
on her project, which depends on her CS investment ci and on the other scientist’s CS
investment c−i. In this sense, the CS investment differs from the monopolist case in
which the scientist is certain to attract citizens. This probability is a modified Tullock
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1 if ci ≥ cinf and c−i < cinf ;
ci
ci + c−i
if ci ≥ cinf and c−i ≥ cinf ;
0 otherwise.
This probability is increasing in the CS investment of scientist i and decreasing in the
CS investment of scientist −i. Observe that the CS investment cannot be recovered for
the loser of the contest. To compare with the monopolist scientist case, ci − cinf is a loss
created entirely by the contest. The benefit, fαv, which represents the implementation
of the project with CS, is random. If both scientists choose the same CS investment,
they have the same probability to win the contest. In short, the expected benefit with
CS under competition is p(ci, c−i)fαv.
Using backward induction, the strategies of the citizens remain the same, that is,
a motivated citizen always exerts effort and a non-motivated one never exerts effort.
Turning to the strategies of the scientists, I focus on Markovian equilibria, that is,
equilibria in which at every period, each scientist chooses always chooses the same CS
cosst. The Markovian state variable is the scientist’s current project value. By choosing
CS, the expected payoff of scientist i at date t is p(ci, c−i)fαv − ci. By choosing TS, her
expected payoff at date t is δv. If both scientists choose CS, they play a pure strategies
Nash equilibrium, with scientist i choosing cBRi (c−i) such that:
cBRi (c−i) = arg max
ci∈[cinf ,+∞)










fαvc−i − c−i if
√
fαvc−i − c−i ≥ cinf ;
cinf otherwise.
Since the game is symmetric, they choose the same equilibrium CS investment.
92 CHAPTER 2. CITIZEN SCIENCE VS. TRADITIONAL SCIENCE
Lemma 2. If the scientists play the same strategies at every period, they both choose




As a consequence, each scientist has the same probability p(c∗, c∗) = 1/2 to attract
citizens. If cinf >
fαv
4




fαv − cinf . Otherwise, they invest
fαv
4
and enjoy at the current period
fαv
4
. In the following Section, I look for a stationary Markovian equilibrium.
5.1 The stationnary Markovian equilibrium
A scientist is constrained if she has chosen TS for the former period’s project, meaning
that she has no choice to make at the current period. By contrast, a scientist is not
constrained if she has chosen CS at the former period, meaning that a new project is
available at the current period. Denote V11 the continuation value of scientist i if both
scientists are not constrained, V10 the continuation value if scientist i is not constrained
but scientist −i is, V01 the value function if scientist i is constrained but not scientist −i
and V00 the value function if both scientists are constrained. Denote k11 the equilibrium
choice of the scientists if they are both constrained and k10 the equilibrium choice of
scientist i if scientist −i is constrained. Fix scientist −i’s strategy to k11 and k10 and
look at a profitable deviation for scientist i. Her continuation values and value functions







fαv − c∗ + δV11
)
+ k(1 − k11)
(
fαv − cinf + δV10
)





fαv − cinf + δV11
)
+ (1 − k)δV01};
V01 =v + δ
[
k10V11 + (1 − k10)V10
]
;
V00 =v + δV11.
If both scientists are not constrained, scientist i’s value function V11 splits in four
terms. First, with probability kk11, both scientists choose CS and they compete to
attract citizens. At the next period, they are not constrained and enjoy the continuation
payoff V11. Second, with probability k(1 − k11), scientist i chooses CS but not scientist
−i and she only has to pay the minimal CS investment cinf to catch citizens. At the next
period, scientist −i is constrained but not scientist i and she enjoys the continuation
payoff V10. Third, with probability (1 − k)k11, scientist i chooses TS and scientist −i
CS. The former is constrained at the next period and enjoys the continuation value
V01. Fourth, with probability (1 − k)(1 − k11), both scientists choose TS and they are
constrained at the next period. Scientist i enjoys the continuation value V00 at the next
period.
If scientist −i is constrained but not scientist i, scientist i’s value function V10 splits
in 2 terms. First, with probability k, she chooses CS and enjoys the monopolist payoff.
At the next period, both scientists are not constrained and she enjoys the continuation
payoff V11. Second, with probability 1 − k, she chooses TS. At the next period, she is
constrained but not scientist −i and enjoys the continuation value V01.
If scientist i is constrained but not scientist −i, then she has no choice to make at
the current period and she enjoys the payoff v. If scientist −i has chosen CS at the
current period, then at the next period she is not constrained and scientist i enjoys the
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continuation value V11. If scientist −i has chosen TS at the current period, then at the
next period, she is constrained but not scientist i and the latter enjoys the continuation
payoff V10.
If both scientists are constrained, scientist i enjoys the payoff v and at the next
period, both scientists are not constrained and scientist i enjoys the continuation payoff
V11.





















k10V11 + (1 − k10)V10
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}.
which are linear in k. In the following section, I focus on symmetric equilibria in pure
strategies in which the scientists have the same strategies.
Symmetric equilibria in pure strategies
There exist three kinds of equilibrium outcomes. Either both scientists choose TS or
both scientists choose CS with an equilibrium CS investment equal to cinf , or both
choose CS with an equilibrium CS investment equal to
fαv
4
. Suppose that when the
project value is below the monopolist cut-off v∗(fα), the equilibrium is such that both
scientists choose TS. Then no scientist has an interest in deviating by choosing CS as she
would not choose it without a competitor. Consequently, this equilibrium exists. Above
the cutoff v∗(fα), a scientist have an interest in deviating from this type of equibrium
as she would obtain the CS monopolist payoff, which is higher than the TS payoff. The
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With competition, each scientist only enjoys half of the attention of the citizens,
that is why fα is multiplied by 1/2. Besides, each pays the CS investment c
∗, instead




scientist’s current payoff with CS becomes
fαv
4
. In this way, the CS quality must be at
least four times higher than the monopolist case, which was
δ
1 + δ
. In addition, if the
discount factor is too high, then the TS option becomes too attractive so that scientists
















Proposition 3. The symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies is unique:
• If fα ≥ f̃α, v ≥ ṽ1(fα) and δ <
1
3




• If ṽ2(fα) ≤ v < ṽ1(fα) and δ <
1
3
, then both scientists choose CS and c∗ = cinf ;
• If v < v∗(fα), then both scientists always choose TS.
If the CS quality is lower than f̃α, then using CS is too costly for scientists, who
have to compete and only enjoy half of the expected CS quality. If the project value is
above ṽ1(fα), then CS becomes very attractive and scientists are ready to pay a high




, to catch citizens. If the project value is between ṽ2(fα) and ṽ1(fα),
then both scientist choose CS and each pays cinf to attract half of the citizens.
Interestingly, there exists no equilibrium in which k11 = 1 and k10 = 0. Indeed,
the expected benefit from choosing CS is always higher when the other scientist is
constrained. Hence, it cannot be that the scientist chooses CS when both are not
constrained and TS when the other is constrained. There exists no equilibrium in which
k11 = 0 and k10 = 1. To choose CS when the other scientist is constrained, it should be
that the project value is sufficiently high. To choose TS when both scientists are not
constrained, it should be that the project value is sufficiently low. These two conditions
cannot hold at the same time.
The three outcomes are represented in Figure 2 if the discount factor is below δ̃.
When this latter is above the threshold, the violet and pink areas do not appear on
the graph. To compare with the deterministic monopolist case, when the project value
lies below v∗(fα), competition has no impact on the scientist’s strategy. The latter
always chooses TS and does not involve citizens. However, when the project value is
above v∗(fα), there exist two sources of inefficiencies. The first one is that in the violet
area, scientists pay a CS investment higher than the minimum cinf to catch citizens.
This loss is created by the contest game. The second inefficiency is that the CS choice,
represented in violet and pink in Figure 2, requires a higher CS quality. It comes from
the fact that each scientist only has one chance out of two to win the contest against
the other. Consequently, there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies in the white area.
In the following Section, I look for the existence of a mixed strategies equilibrium in
these area.











CS with c∗ = cinf
CS with c∗ =
fαv
4
no equilibrium in pure strategies




Symmetric equilibria in mixed strategies
Intuitively, competition decreases the expected payoff of one scientist. Hence, the
value function when scientists are not constrained is always lower than when only the
competitor is constrained. In this way, if k10 = 0, then k11 = 0. This removes equilibria
of the type: i) k11 = 1 and k10 ∈ (0, 1) and ii) k11 ∈ (0, 1) and k10 = 0. Besides,
no equilibrium of the type k11 = 0 and k10 ∈ (0, 1) exists for the same reason as no
equibrium of the type k11 = 0 and k10 = 1 exists. If both scientists are not constrained
and mix between TS and CS, then the TS option is attractive. It means that the project
value is low enough. If the competitor is constrained and the scientist mixes between
CS and TS, then the CS option is attractive. It means that the project value is high
enough. As a matter of fact, these two conditions cannot be true at the same time.
Consequently, there exists no equilibrium with k11 ∈ (0, 1) and k10 ∈ (0, 1). The only
existing symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies is the following.
Proposition 4. If {f ∗α < fα < f̃α and v ≥ v∗(fα)} or {fα > f̃α and v∗(fα) ≤ v <
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ṽ2(fα)}, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies characterized
by the following scientists’ strategy:
• If both scientists are not constrained, they mix between CS and TS. If they both
pick CS,





– Otherwise, they pay c∗ = cinf ;
• If one scientist is constrained, then the other always chooses CS.
Together with the pure strategies equilibria, this equilibrium forms a partition of the
graph (fα, v). Interestingly, two sources of randomness appear in this equilibrium. The
first one comes from the contest between the scientists to attract citizens. The winner
attracts the two citizens on her project and the loser pays the sunk CS investment,
without enjoying any benefit. At the next period, both scientists remain not constrained.
Hence, this source of randomness has no implication for what happens next.
The second one comes from the fact that, when both scientists are not constrained,
they mix between TS and CS. It induces a persistence effect over two periods: when one
scientist randomly picks TS at equilibrium, her competitor benefits from her monopoly
situation. Over two periods, she only pays the minimum CS investment, cinf to catch
citizens, when the other scientist cannot work on the next project. At the current period,
this situation induces no loss of efficiency as both projects are implemented and the
CS investment is minimized. Besides, there is no learning by doing here: the unlucky
scientist is stuck in a non-optimal equilibrium which only benefits her opponent. This
can be analyzed as a lock-in effect.
If both scientists randomly pick CS at equilibrium, then they compete to attract
citizens. In this case, only one project is implemented and the other one is throwned
away. This creates a loss of efficiency for the current period. If both scientists randomly
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picks TS, then there is no use of CS and no contest. Both projects are implemented
with certainty but it requires time. By contrast, the monopolist scientist chooses CS for
this range of project values. Accordingly, to compare with the monopolist case, there is
an efficiency loss in the speed at which projects are implemented.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyzed the scientists’ strategies when they trade-off between TS
and CS. When the scientist is a monopolist, there exists a unique cut-off above which
she always chooses CS, and below it she chooses TS. Introducing a competitor implies
that in the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium in pure strategies: i) the cut-off to
choose TS is the same as the monopolist case; ii) to choose CS, the minimum CS quality
must be higher than in the monopolist case; iii) for intermediate project values, there
exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies but no equilibrium in pure strategies.
This chapter allows to question the government policy to adopt regarding CS. Should
the government (he) encourage the use of CS or restrict it only to one project? The
answer is not obvious if two scientists compete to attract citizens. If the projects value
is low, both scientists choose TS. As a matter of fact, a restriction on the CS use has
no effect on the scientists’ strategy. If scientists choose CS, then more projects are
implemented than with TS. However, if the projects value is high, both scientists use
CS with high CS costs. Accordingly, there are two inefficiencies losses. The first one
is due to the winner-takes-all contest and the second one due to high CS costs. When
the scientists use CS with minimal CS costs, only the first inefficiency remains. The
action of the government depends on his objective. If he is interested in implementing
projects faster, then he should not restrict the use of CS. If instead, he is interested in
minimizing the efficiency losses at the current period, then he should restrict the CS
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use only to one project.
For intermediate projects values, in the mixed strategies equilibrium, it can happen
that one scientist uses CS and the competitor uses TS. In this case, the CS cost is
minimized and the project implemented with TS is for sure of good quality. Consequently,
there is no efficiency loss. This argument is in favor of no government intervention.
But it can also happen that both scientists picks TS, which is bad as the speed of
projects implementation is slowed down compared to the monopolist case. This argument
encourages the use of CS with subsidies to lower CS costs. If both scientists picks CS,
then the analysis remains the same as high projects values.
To go further, taking a look at the duopolist case, the inefficiencies created by the
symmetric equilibrium could be avoided with an asynchronous equilibrium. Indeed, by
letting the other behave as a monopolist for two periods, one scientist would choose TS.
Two periods after, the roles would be reversed to avoid paying a high cost due to the
contest. In this way, the scientists’ projects would always be implemented with certainty
and without efficiency loss. Besides, the duopolist analysis could be enriched by looking
at Markovian equilibrium with punishment strategies. For instance, for sufficiently high
project values, an equilibrium in which both scientists choose CS with the minimum CS
cost would be sustainable. In this way, high sunk CS costs could be prevented.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The function to maximize is linear in k. The scientist’s optimal choice k∗ depends on
the sign of
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V.
If (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V ≥ 0, then k∗ = 1. In this case, the continuation value
V is equal to
V = fαv − cinf + δV






Replacing V into the inequality, the scientist chooses CS for every project if







(1 + δ)fα − δ
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, the inequality never holds. Hence, the scientist uses CS if the project






















If (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V < 0, then k∗ = 0. In this case, the continuation value
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V is equal to
V = δv + δ2V ⇔ V = δ
1 − δ2 v.
Replacing V into the inequality, the scientist chooses TS for every project if











which is the opposite of the inequality for the CS choice. Consequently, the scientist
uses TS if the project value is below v∗(fα).
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote C([v, v̄]) the set of bounded continuous functions on [v, v̄]. If V is bounded




every v ∈ [v, v̄], is bounded and continuous. If follows that the function to maximize
is continuous. Moreover, the set [0, 1] is compact. Hence, from the theorem of the
maximum, the maximum is attained and the function TV is continuous. In this way,
the operator T maps C([v, v̄]) into C([v, v̄]).
Take V and V ′ such that
∀v ∈ [v, v̄] , V (v) ≤ V ′(v).
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Fix v ∈ [v, v̄]. Then
V (v) ≤ V ′(v) ⇒ E(V (v+)|v) ≤ E(V ′(v+)|v)
⇒ TV (v) ≤ TV ′(v)
Hence, T is increasing in V . To apply Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a con-
traction, T must also verify the discounting property. Take V ∈ C([v, v̄]), a ≥ 0 and
v ∈ [v, v̄].





(fα − δ)v − cinf
)
+ δ(k + δ(1 − k))
∫ v̄
v
(V (v+) + a)g(v+|v)dv+
}
≤ (TV )(v) + δa.
Hence, T satisfies the Blackwell’s sufficient conditions and is a contraction with modulus
δ. Since C([v, v̄]) is a Banach space, then from the contraction mapping theorem, T has
a unique fixed point V ∈ C([v, v̄]).
Furthermore, let C ′([v, v̄]) ⊂ C([v, v̄]) be the set of bounded, continuous and nonde-
creasing functions on [v, v̄], and let C ′′([v, v̄]) ⊂ C([v, v̄]) be the set of strictly increasing
functions. Denote H the function:
H : [v, v̄] × [0, 1] → R
v × k 7→ δv + k
(
(fα − δ)v − cinf
)











⇒ H(v, k) > H(v′, k).
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Hence, for each k, H(·, k) is strictly increasing. Hence, T [C ′([v, v̄])] ⊆ C′′([v, v̄]). By
the corollary 1 to the contraction mapping theorem in Stokey and Lucas (1989), V ∗ is
strictly increasing in v. Hence, there exists a unique threshold v∗∗ ∈ [v, v̄] such that
k∗ = 1 for v ≥ v∗∗ and k∗ = 0 otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2
cBRi (c−i) = arg max
ci∈[cinf ,+∞[
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fαvci − ci if
√
fαvci − ci ≥ cinf ;
cinf otherwise.




⇔ 4c2 = cfαv
⇔ c = fαv
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fαv − c∗ + δV11
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+ k(1 − k11)
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k10V11 + (1 − k10)V10
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k10V11 + (1 − k10)V10
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fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
≥ 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 ≥ 0, then
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = 1 and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = 1. By symmetry, k11 = 1 and k10 = 1.











fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δ)V11 ≥ 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V11 ≥ 0
⇔ δ(1 − δ)V11 ≥ max{c∗ − (
1
2
fα − δ)v, cinf − (fα − δ)v}
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2
fα − δ)v
⇔ ((1 + δ)1
2
fα − δ)v ≥ (1 + δ)c∗







In this case, both scientists are never constrained and always choose CS.
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fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
≥ 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 < 0, then
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = 1 and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = 0. By symmetry, k11 = 1 and k10 = 0.











fα − δ)v − c∗ + δV11 − δ2V10 ≥ 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10 < 0
⇔ c∗ − (1
2
fα − δ)v ≤ δV11 − δ2V10 < cinf − (fα − δ)v
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For this condition to hold, it must be that
c∗ − (1
2
fα − δ)v < cinf − (fα − δ)v










fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
< 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 ≥ 0, then
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = 0 and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = 1. By symmetry, k11 = 0 and k10 = 1.








(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11 < 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V11 ≥ 0
⇔ −δ(1 − δ)V11 ≤ (fα − δ)v − cinf < −δ(V10 − δV11)
For this condition to hold, it must be that
−δ(1 − δ)V11 < −δ(V10 − δV11)
⇔ V11 > V10
I have
V11 =δ(v + δV11) ⇔ V11 =
δ
1 − δ2 v
V10 =fαv − cinf + δV11 = fαv − cinf +
δ2
1 − δ2 v
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The necessary condition can be rewritten
δ
1 − δ2 v > fαv − cinf +
δ2























−δ(1 − δ) δ
1 − δ2 v ≤ (fα − δ)v − cinf < −δ(fαv − cinf +
δ2
1 − δ2 v − δ
δ

































































v ≤ (fα − δ)v − cinf










































fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
< 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 < 0, then
110 CHAPTER 2. CITIZEN SCIENCE VS. TRADITIONAL SCIENCE
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = 0 and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = 0. By symmetry, k11 = 0 and k10 = 0.








(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11 < 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10 < 0















1 − δ2 v
Hence, the condition can be rewritten
(fα − δ)v − cinf < δ(δ − 1)
δ
1 − δ2 v








This condition is the same as the monopolist case. Hence, both scientists choose TS
if v < v∗(fα).
Proof of Proposition 4






fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
≥ 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 = 0, then
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = 1 and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = k ∈ (0, 1). By symmetry, k11 = 1 and
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fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 ≥ 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 = 0
⇔ (1
2
fα − δ)v − c∗ ≥ (fα − δ)v − cinf

















fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
< 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 = 0, then
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = 0 and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = k ∈ (0, 1). By symmetry, k11 = 0 and








(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11 < 0









(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11 < 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10 + δ2k10(V10 − V11) = 0
From the equality, I have
k10 =
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10
δ2(V11 − V10)
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(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10
δ2(V11 − V10)
> 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10 < δ2(V11 − V10)
Moreover, replacing k11 = 0 and k10 in V11 and V10, I obtain
V11 =δ(v + δV11) ⇔ V11 =
δ
1 − δ2 v
V10 =k10
[
fαv − cinf + δV11
]




k10V11 + (1 − k10)V10
)]
⇔ V10 =fαv − cinf +
δ2
1 − δ2 v
















(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11 < 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10
δ2(V11 − V10)
> 0




























v − cinf < 0































v − cinf > 0






fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
= 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 ≥ 0, then
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arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = k ∈ (0, 1) and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = 1. By symmetry, k11 ∈ (0, 1) and













fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δ)V11
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
= 0









(fα − δ)v − cinf − δ2V11 + δV10 + k11
(
cinf − c∗ −
1
2
fαv + δV11 − δV10
)
= 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V11 ≥ 0
Hence
k11 =
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11)
c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv + δ(V10 − V11)




















(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11) < c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv + δ(V10 − V11)
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11)
c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv + δ(V10 − V11)
> 0

















(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11)
c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv + δ(V10 − V11)
> 0
I have
V11 =δ(v + δV11) ⇔ V11 =
δ
1 − δ2 v
V10 =fαv − cinf + δV11
=fαv − cinf +
δ2
1 − δ2 v
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v ≥ max{v∗(fα), ṽ1(fα)}
fα < f̃α







fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
= 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 < 0, then
arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = k ∈ (0, 1) and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = 0. By symmetry, k11 ∈ (0, 1) and













fα − δ)v − c∗ + δV11 − δ2V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
= 0









(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11 + k11
(
cinf − c∗ −
1
2
fαv + δ(1 + δ)(V11 − V10)
)
= 0
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV11 − δ2V10 < 0
From the equality, I have
k11 =
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
c∗ − cinf +
1
2














+ (1 − k11)δ(v + δV11)
=k11
δ
1 − δ2 v + (1 − k11)δ(v + δV11)
There are 2 solutions for V11:
V 111 =
δ
1 − δ2 v
V 211 =
fα(1 − δ4)v + 2δ2v + 2(1 − δ2)
(
(1 − δ2)c∗ − cinf
)
2δ(1 + δ − 2δ2 − δ3 + δ4)
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which is impossible, hence V11 cannot be equal to V
1













fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v −
cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
= 0 and (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10 = 0,
then arg maxk∈[0,1] V11 = k ∈ [0, 1] and arg maxk∈[0,1] V10 = k ∈ (0, 1). By symmetry,
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fα − δ)v − c∗ + δ(1 − δk10)V11 − δ2(1 − k10)V10
)
+ (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δV10 − δ2V11
)
= 0











cinf − c∗ −
1
2
fαv + δ(1 + δ(1 − k10))(V11 − V10)
)
+ (fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11) = 0
k10 =













(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11)
c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv + δ(1 + δ(1 − k10))(V10 − V11)
k10 =
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V11 − δV10)
δ2(V11 − V10)
⇒k11 =
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11)











(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11)
c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv − cinf + (fα − δ)v + δ(V10 − δV11)
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(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11) < c∗ − cinf +
1
2
fαv − cinf + (fα − δ)v + δ(V10 − δV11)
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V11 − δV10)
δ2(V11 − V10)
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(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V10 − δV11) > 0




(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(V11 − δV10)
δ2(V11 − V10)
> 0

















−δ(1 − δ)V11 > (fα − δ)v − cinf > δ(δV11 − V10)
V11 < V10
















































δ(V11 − V10)v +
(
(fα − δ)v − cinf
)
(V11 − V10) + δ(V11 − δV10)V11 − δ(1 − δ)V11V10
)]





k10V11 + (1 − k10)V10
)]
+ (1 − k11)δ(v + δV11)
=k11
(
fαv − cinf + δV11
)
+ (1 − k11)δ(v + δV11)
Then
V10 − V11 = (1 − k11)
(
(fα − δ)v − cinf + δ(1 − δ)V11
)
> 0
⇒ δ(1 − δ)V11 > cinf − (fα − δ)v
which is incompatible with the conditions, hence this case never exists.
120
Bibliography
Bagnoli, Mark and Barton L. Lipman (1989) “Provision of public goods: Fully imple-
menting the core through private contributions,” The Review of Economic Studies, 56
(4), 583–601.
Bergstrom, Theodore, Lawrence Blume, and Hal Varian (1986) “On the private provision
of public goods,” Journal of public economics, 29 (1), 25–49.
Bernard, Olga (2020) “Fighting for priority: researcher’s dilemma with an alternative,”
working paper.
Bramoullé, Yann and Gilles Saint-Paul (2010) “Research cycles,” Journal of economic
theory, 145 (5), 1890–1920.
Cooper, Caren B., Jennifer Shirk, and Benjamin Zuckerberg (2014) “The invisible
prevalence of citizen science in global research: migratory birds and climate change,”
PloS one, 9 (9), e106508.
Franzoni, Chiara and Henry Sauermann (2014) “Crowd science: The organization of
scientific research in open collaborative projects,” Research policy, 43 (1), 1–20.
Garfagnini, Umberto and Bruno Strulovici (2012) “Social learning and innovation
cycles,”Technical report, CSIO Working Paper.
Koeze, Ella and Nathaniel Popper (2020) “The virus changed the way we internet,” The
New York Times.
Kullenberg, Christopher and Dick Kasperowski (2016) “What is citizen science?–A
scientometric meta-analysis,” PloS one, 11 (1), e0147152.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 121
Laut, Jeffrey, Francesco Cappa, Oded Nov, and Maurizio Porfiri (2017) “Increasing
citizen science contribution using a virtual peer,” Journal of the Association for
Information Science and Technology, 68 (3), 583–593.
Lukyanenko, Roman, Jeffrey Parsons, and Yolanda F. Wiersma (2016) “Emerging
problems of data quality in citizen science,” Conservation Biology, 30 (3), 447–449.
Mahajan, Sachit, Prashant Kumar, Janaina Antonino Pinto, Agnese Riccetti, Katinka
Schaaf, Guillem Camprodon, Viktor Smari, Antonella Passani, and Giuseppe Forino
(2020) “A citizen science approach for enhancing public understanding of air pollution,”
Sustainable Cities and Society, 52, 101800.
Nov, Oded, Ofer Arazy, and David Anderson (2014) “Scientists@ Home: what drives the
quantity and quality of online citizen science participation?” PloS one, 9 (4), e90375.
Poisson, Autumn C., Ian M. McCullough, Kendra S. Cheruvelil, Kevin C. Elliott, Jo A.
Latimore, and Patricia A. Soranno (2020) “Quantifying the contribution of citizen
science to broad-scale ecological databases,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment,
18 (1), 19–26.
Prestopnik, Nathan, Kevin Crowston, and Jun Wang (2017) “Gamers, citizen scien-
tists, and data: Exploring participant contributions in two games with a purpose,”
Computers in Human Behavior, 68, 254–268.
Rowland, Katherine (2012) “Citizen science goes ‘extreme’,” Nature News, 17.
Stokey, Nancy L, RE Lucas, and EC Prescott (1989) “Recursive methods in dynamic
economics,” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Theobald, Ellinore J., Ailene K. Ettinger, Hillary K. Burgess, Lauren B. DeBey, Natalie R.
Schmidt, Halley E. Froehlich, Christian Wagner, Janneke Hille Ris Lambers, Joshua
122
Tewksbury, Melanie A. Harsch et al. (2015) “Global change and local solutions:
Tapping the unrealized potential of citizen science for biodiversity research,” Biological
Conservation, 181, 236–244.
Varian, Hal (2004) “System reliability and free riding,” in Economics of information
security, 1–15: Springer.
Watson, David and Luciano Floridi (2018) “Crowdsourced science: sociotechnical




Citizen science and preemption
Abstract I study the tradeoff of the scientist who chooses between citizen science (CS)
and traditional science (TS) for her research. After time 0, there exists a new idea
which can be studied. Two scientists can discover this idea at any time. Their objective
is to publish it before the other one does. However, competition is only potential as
a scientist’s discovery time is not observable by her competitor. At the scientist’s
discovery time, she faces two technological choices, which are not available past that
time. The first one is TS: she takes time to let the idea mature. There exists an
optimal maturation delay which maximizes her publication payoff with TS without any
competitor. With the second choice, called CS, the scientist involves citizens’ help to
publish instantaneously the idea. However, she incurs a fixed cost to make the idea
available to citizens. Moreover, the latters are non-experts so there is some risk error
that the publication is of bad quality, which brings her no payoff. Focusing on Bayesian
pure-strategy equilibria, I prove that there exists two kind of symmetric stationary
equilibria. When CS is low-cost, every scientist chooses CS. Otherwise, everyone chooses
TS. Besides, I study equilibria in which every scientist chooses TS before a discovery
time threshold and CS after. There exists no such equilibrium when it satisfies one of
123
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these two assumptions: i) the threshold discovery time is lower than the equilibrium
publication time of the scientist discovering the idea at time 0 and ii) the equilibrium
scientists’ strategy is continuous at the threshold discovery time. At last, there exists




In our highly interconnected world, scientists face many challenges to publish their
work. To begin with, new methods and techniques are available to work on a novel
idea. More specifically, citizen science is a new way of doing science which has emerged
this last decade. It enables the scientist to use the citizens’ help to work faster than
with traditional science. For instance, Galaxy Zoo is a project created in 2007 in which
citizens treat over a million of galaxies’ data in order to report dust particules. Without
the citizens’ help, a type of astronomic object would not have been identified and the
data treatment would have taken several decades. Another famous citizen science project
is FoldIt. Launched in 2008, this online game allows the citizens to work on proteins
shapes to better understand their functioning. In 2010, more than 200000 people already
participated to that project. In short, citizen science is caracterized by its speed of
research compared to traditional science.
Besides, citizen science has no formal structure. In 2009, Timothy Gowers, a 1998
Fields Medal winner mathematician, started to post on his blog a mathematical problem
as an experiment to collectively solve it. Within six weeks, several contributors, includ-
ing university professors, school teachers, PhD students and another Fields medalist,
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discussed until a proof was found. Eventually, the article stating the proof was published
in the Annals of Mathematics under the pseudonym “D.H.J. Polymath” (Polymath,
2012). Thrilled by this success, Timothy Gowers posted several other problems. The
structure of this citizen science project differs from FoldIt and Galaxy Zoo as it is
rather addressed to mathematicians. Nevertheless, it shares the feature that anybody is
able to join the project. Eventually, citizen science enables to implement projects very
fast but citizens are not experts. In this respect, the quality of the project outcome is
questionable, as stated by Lukyanenko et al. (2016).
Another challenge is inherent to the fact that scientists are aware almost instanta-
neously of publication around the world. Hence, when a scientist works on a new idea,
another one could be working on it at the other side of the planet but she is not aware
of it. She only notices this fact when a potential competitor publishes first the idea. As
being a “follower” brings only little value, the scientist aims at having the “first-mover”
advantage. In this respect, her fear of being preempted in this fight for prioriy leads her
to publish her idea before it is mature enough.
To study these challenges, I build a theoretical model using a preemption game
approach. At the beginning of the game, a new idea can be discovered by two scientists.
Scientists discover the idea at random times, which are independently drawn from an
exponential distribution. The discovery time of one scientist is not observed by her
competitor. After that time, they can publish the discovery. However, they fight for
priority. It means that when one scientist publishes her discovery, her competitor cannot
publish and the game stops.
At her discovery time, each scientist faces a technological choice: traditional science
(TS) or citizen science (CS). This choice is not available anymore past that time. If
she chooses TS, she takes time to let the idea mature. Her publication payoff depends
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on the idea’s maturation delay. Besides, there is an optimal maturation delay which
maximizes her payoff without a competitor. If she is preempted by her rival, she enjoys
no payoff. I assume that the two scientists cannot publish simultaneously.
If she chooses CS, the scientist involves the help of citizens for her research, which
enables her to publish instantaneously her discovery. This reflects the fact that citizen
science is faster than traditional science. To make the idea available to citizens, the
scientist incurs a fixed cost. As CS involves non-experts, there exists a risk that the
publication is of bad quality, which brings her no payoff. I assume that the CS cost is
low, so that the scientist’s payoff with CS is strictly positive. In this way, there always
exists a trade-off between the two technological choices.
Focusing on Bayesian pure-strategy equilibria, a scientist’s strategy is composed by
her technological choice and her publication time if she chooses TS. I first look at a
scientist’s strategy if she chooses TS. Her payoff is equal to the publication payoff by
letting the idea mature until her publication time, multiplied by the probability that her
competitor (he) does not publish before that time, knowing that he has not published
before her discovery time. In any Bayesian equilibrium, a scientist who uses TS to
publish at her equilibrium publication time must have at the same time a higher payoff
than if she chooses TS and publishes after any other time, and than the CS payoff. A
scientist who uses CS must have a higher payoff than if she uses TS to publish at any
time. First, I focus on symmetric equilibria, in which both scientists have the same
strategy. Using a standard revealed-preference argument, I prove that is both scientists
choose TS, the equilibrium publication time is weakly increasing in the discovery time.
In addition and to facilitate the analysis, I assume that it is strictly increasing.
By first studying symmetric stationary equilibrium, a possible candidate for equilib-
rium would be that early-born scientists waits before publication a constant maturation
delay and late-born choose CS. There would be a threshold discovery time such that a
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scientist discovering this idea at that time is indifferent between the two technological
choices. To study this type of equilibrium, the equilibrium payoff of an early-born
scientist who chooses TS must be compared to the CS payoff. Solving the maximization
problem of a scientist choosing TS, I find that the equilibrium maturation delay depends
on the discovery speed but not on the discovery time. The payoff of a scientist publishing
with TS after this stationary maturation delay depends on whether her discovery time is
higher or lower than this maturation delay. If it is higher, then the probability of being
preempted is the probability that her competitor is born during the interval of a length
equal to the maturation delay, before her discovery time. If it is lower, the probability
of being preempted is the probability that her competitor discovers the idea before her.
When the CS cost is low, even the scientist discovering the idea at time 0 prefers
CS. Hence, at equilibrium, both scientists choose CS. When the CS cost is high, both
scientists choose TS at equilibrium. A discontinuous stationary equilibrium may exist
when the CS cost is intermediate. I focus on such equilibria, in which the two scientists
always publish after the threshold discovery time. As a matter of fact, the scientist
discovering the idea at that threshold strictly prefers CS to TS. This is a contradiction
to the fact that she must be indifferent between the two technological choices. Hence,
such an equilibrium does not exist. Consequently, when the CS cost is intermediate, the
two scientists choose CS. In this way, there exist only two kinds of symmetric stationary
equilibria. When the CS cost is low, scientists choose CS. Otherwise, they choose TS.
To go further, a discontinuous equilibrium may exist in the intermediate CS cost
range if the equilibrium scientists’ strategy is non-stationary. Again, I suppose that the
two scientists always publish after the threshold discovery time. Scientists discovering
the idea before the latter face a low preemption risk, whereas those discovering the idea
after the threshold face a high preemtion risk. Combining the incitation constraints of
two scientists, one discovering the idea just before the threshold and one just after, I
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find that the difference between the two payoffs tends to 0 as their discovery times tend
to the threshold. Consequently, the equilibrium payoff function is continuous. In this
respect, the scientist discovering the idea at the threshold is indifferent between the two
technological choices. Similar to the non-existence proof of a stationary equilibrium,
a scientist who discovers the idea just before the threshold faces already a too high
preemption risk and chooses CS instead. Hence, such a discontinuous non-stationary
equilibrium does not exist.
The non-existence problem of an equilibrium in which early-born scientists choose
TS and late-borns choose CS may come from the discontinuity at the threshold discovery
time. In this respect, I look for a symmetric equilibrium which exhibits a continuous
strategy. As the discovery time of an early-born scientist tends to the threshold, her
maturation delay tends to 0. However, as her maturation delay goes to 0, so does
her payoff with TS. When her discovery time is sufficiently close to the threshold, the
payoff with TS is lower than the CS payoff. It implies that she has a strictly profitable
deviation by choosing CS. Consequently, there exists no such equilibrium.
Finally, the only type of equilibrium which exists is when all scientists choose the same
technological choice, no matter their discovery times. This creates a congestion in the
CS use. Indeed, citizens have limited time and attention to get involved in the scientists’
discoveries. An equilibrium in which early-born scientists choose TS and late-born ones
choose CS would have been interesting as they have time to adapt to the technological
change CS. An asymmetric equilibrium would remove the congestion problem with CS,
that is, the two scientists make different technological choices. I focus on the case where
the scientist who chooses TS publishes after a constant maturation delay. As a matter of
fact, an early-born scientist who chooses TS faces a preemption risk, which does not exist
in a symmetric equilibrium. Hence, she has a strictly profitable deviation, which is to
choose CS as her competitor. Consequently, there exists no such asymmetric equilibrium.
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Related literature Close to this chapter lies Bernard (2020). In this paper, I
study the researchers’ tradeoff between traditional science and citizen science. For
any successive project available of a list of projects, two researchers choose between
traditional science and citizen science to implement it. On one hand, traditional science
takes time but the implementation is certain. On the other hand, citizen science enables
her to implement instantaneously the project but with a failure implementation risk. In
this respect, my model is in line with Bernard (2020). This risk depends on the effort
exerted by two citizens. Besides, scientists fight to attract citizens on their project. By
contrast, in this chapter, using traditional science involves potential competition. A
researcher’s payoff depends on the idea’s maturation delay and on potential competition
from the other researcher.
In the literature of preemption games, which are timing games with a first-mover
advantage, a seminal paper is a model applied to technological competition, from
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They proved that, for a duopoly, firms’ equilibrium
payoffs are equalized and rents are fully dissipated. This is not the case in my model
since there is an asymmmetry of information between players, which leaves rents to
researchers. Hendricks (1992) extended Fudenberg and Tirole’s paper (1985) and showed
that between being an innovator or an imitator, firms prefers to make believe they are
imitators in order to soften the competition for the adoption of a new technology. This
is linked to my setting because it is in the interest of the researchers to make believe
they are not “born” yet. This is modeled by the breakthrough distribution, which is
independent of researchers’ will. In addition, Hopenhayn and Squintani (2010) studied
preemption games applied to patent races, in which information is private. They showed
that R&D secrecy slows down innovation disclosure compared to the public information
case. In my model, I only study the private information case but it is easy to see that
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the public information case will lead to the same kind of results, that is, shorten the
maturation delay before publishing.
Weeds (2002) and Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) studied the case of real options.
In Weeds’ model (2002), firms who invest jointly in a project tend to delay their
investment because of the patent-race which follows the breakthrough. Applied to
preemption games, Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) showed that firms face a tradeoff
between learning about the future return of an uncertain project and the risk of being
preempted when there is uncertainty about other’s costs. On the contrary, in my model,
players fear only potential competition and they do not know whether other players are
working on the same idea.
More recently, Bobtcheff and Mariotti (2012) focused on uncertainty, which arises
when a researcher who has experienced a breakthrough does not bring the others re-
searchers up to date. Therefore they make their decisions relative to some probability
distribution about the others’ breakthrough times. The payoff function does not depend
on depend on breakthrough time, whereas it is the case in my model. They found
that in any Bayesian perfect equilibrium, distribution of players’ moving times was the
same. To compare with Hendricks’ model (1992), in this paper, as everyone knows the
breakthrough distribution, which is symmetric, there is “eroding reputation” whereas it
does not exist in Hendricks’ (1992). Brunnermeier and Morgan (2010) study a model
in which players receive, at a random and secret times, signals about a payoff-relevant
state variable. In this model, clocks are therefore not synchronized. They found that
delay is decreased when clocks became more synchronized. By contrast, in my model,
players clocks are synchronized.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies
the existence of pure-strategy equilibria. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
Time is continuous on [0, +∞). Time 0 represents the time of a pioneering discovery
that opens up a new research field. Past that time, a new idea can be discovered. There
are two identical scientists, 1 and 2. Calendar time is common knowledge, that is, they
both know that at time 0, time starts to count. Both scientists are risk-neutral and
discount future payoffs at the same rate. Scientist i ∈ {1, 2} discovers the new idea
at some random time τ̃ i. After that time, they can publish the discovery. The two
scientists fight for priority. It means that if one scientist publishes before the other,
then the game stops and the other cannot publish. The scientists’ discovery times τ̃ 1
and τ̃ 2 are independently drawn from an exponential distribution with parameter λ > 0.
Accordingly, λ is called the discovery speed.
At her discovery time, a scientist (she) chooses between two technological choices:
traditional science (TS) and citizen science (CS). With TS, she takes time to let the idea
mature before publishing it. If a scientist born at τ chooses TS and publishes before her
opponent at time t ≥ τ , then she obtains the publication payoff L(t − τ), which depends
on the idea’s maturation delay. If instead, she is preempted by her rival, she obtains
0. A scientist who discovers the idea at τ is called a τ -born. The two scientists cannot
publish simultaneously. The payoff function L : [0; +∞) → [0; +∞) is continuous and
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twice continuously differentiable over (0; +∞). I make the following assumptions.
L(0) = 0 and L̇(0) = +∞,
L(m) > 0 if m > 0,
L̇(m) > 0 if m > M,
L̇(m) < 0 if m > M,
L̈(m) < 0 if m < M.
In that way, L is positive, achieves his maximum in M and is increasing and concave
between 0 and M . L represents for instance the discounted payoff of future rewards
coming after the publication of the matured idea. Furthermore, M > 0 maximizes the
scientist’s TS publication payoff. M represents the optimal maturation delay that a
scientist would choose if she was not threatened by preemption.
The second technological choice, CS, is not available anymore after the scientist’s
discovery time. Indeed, as she works by herself on the idea, she gets passionate into
her work and becomes more reluctant to disclose information about her research. By
choosing CS, she incurs a fixed cost c ∈ (0, L(M)) to publish instantaneously the matured
discovery. This cost represents the investment to incur to create a platform through
which citizens can participate. As soon as this platform is created, the high number
of citizens who contribute enables the idea to be mature very quickly. However, as
non-specialists are involved in the idea’s maturation, the publication quality is uncertain.
With probability p ∈ (0, 1), the publication is of good quality and the scientist enjoys
the optimal maturation payoff L(M). With probability 1 − p, the publication is of bad
quality, and she enjoys no payoff. Besides, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 1.
c < pL(M)
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In that way, the scientist’s instantaneous payoff at her discovery time pL(M) − c is
strictly positive.1 This ensures that there exists a trade-off between the two technological
choices.
3 Equilibrium analysis
I focus on Bayesian pure-strategy equilibria. A scientist’s strategy is composed by her
technological choice and her publication time if she chooses TS. Consider the strategy
in which the scientist chooses TS and publishes directly at the discovery time. Due to
Assumption 1, she could always be better-off by choosing CS and enjoying the payoff
pL(M) − c instead of 0. Consequently, this strategy is strictly dominated and the
scientist never chooses TS and publish at τ at equilibrium. In this way, a strategy for
scientist i ∈ {1, 2} is a function σi : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) that specifies, for each possible
value τ i of her discovery time, the time σi(τ i) at which she publishes her discovery.
σi(τ i) = τ i represents the equilibrium strategy of scientist i is she chooses CS. σi(τ i) > τ i
represents her equilibrium strategy if she publishes with TS at time σi(τ i).
If scientist i chooses TS, her payoff depends on her type τ i, on player j’s strategy σj,
and on her publication time ti. It is equal to the publication payoff by letting the idea
mature during time ti − τ i, multiplied by the probability that her competitor will not
publish before time ti, knowing that he has not published before her discovery time τ i:
V i(ti, τ i, σj) = P (σj(τ̃ j) > ti|σj(τ̃ j) > τ i)L(ti − τ i)
=
P ({σj(τ̃ j) > ti} ∩ {σj(τ̃ j) > τ i})
P (σj(τ̃ j) > τ i)
L(ti − τ i)
V i(ti, τ i, σj) =
P (σj(τ̃ j) > ti)
P (σj(τ̃ j) > τ i)
L(ti − τ i) (1)
1Results still hold for any strictly positive payoff which is less than the optimally matured payoff.
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The last equality comes from the fact that the publication time is always greater
than the discovery time.
Definition 1. A pair (σ1, σ2) is a Bayesian equilibrium if for each i, τ i ≥ 0 and ti ≥ τ i:
1. If scientist i publishes with TS at time σi(τ i), her payoff must be at the same time
greater than if she publishes with TS at any other time and greater than if she
chooses CS:
V i(σi(τ i), τ i, σj) ≥ V i(ti, τ i, σj) (2)
V i(σi(τ i), τ i, σj) ≥ pL(M) − c (3)
2. If scientist i chooses CS, her payoff must be greater than if she publishes with TS
at any time ti > τ i, that is,
pL(M) − c ≥ V i(ti, τ i, σj) (4)
First, I focus on symmetric equilibria, that is, σi(τ i) = σ(τ) for all i ∈ {1, 2}. If
scientists choose TS, then from a standard revealed-preference argument, using Inequality
2, the publication time is non decreasing in the discovery time.
Lemma 1. If both scientists choose TS, then σ is weakly increasing in τ .
In addition, I make the following assumption, which helps for the equilibrium analysis.
Assumption 2. If both scientists choose TS, σ is strictly increasing in τ .
In the following section, I focus on the existence of stationary equilibria, in which
scientists choosing TS publish after a constant maturation delay, whatever their discovery
time.
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3.1 Existence of a symmetric stationary equilibrium
Intuitively, a possible equilibrium candidate would be the following: if one scientist is
born before some threshold discovery time τ ∗, she does not fear potential competition
enough and let the idea mature a constant maturation delay (cmd). If instead she is
born after that threshold, potential competition becomes too fierce and she chooses CS.







τ ∗ + cmd
σ(τ) = τ
σ(τ) = τ + cmd
Figure 1 – a stationary equilibrium where scientists publish with TS after a constant
maturation delay when born before τ ∗ and choose CS when born after τ ∗
To prove the existence of an equilibrium of this kind, I must compare, at the scientist’s
discovery time, her ex-ante payoff if she publishes with TS after a constant maturation
delay, to the CS payoff pL(M) − c. First, I study the scientists strategies if they choose
TS. Assumption 2 implies that if scientists choose TS, the strategy σ can be inverted. In
other words, φ = σ−1 is well defined and continuous on σ([0, ∞)). If a scientist chooses
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TS, her maximization problem at her discovery time τ is the following:
max
t≥τ
P (σ̃(τ̃) > t)
P (σ̃(τ̃) > τ)
L(t − τ) = max
t≥τ
P (σ̃(τ̃) > t)L(t − τ)
= max
t≥τ
P (τ̃ > φ(t))L(t − τ)
= max
t≥τ
e−λ.φ(t)L(t − τ) (5)
Taking the first order condition with respect to t, I find that the scientist publishes
after a maturation delay Mλ which depends on the discovery speed λ but not on the
discovery time τ . If she discovers the idea before the maturation delay Mλ, then the
probability of preempt her competitor is the complementary of the probability that he
discovers the idea between time 0 and time τ , which is e−λτ . If she discovers the idea
after time Mλ, then the probability of preempt her competitor is the complementary of
the probability that he discovers the idea between time τ − Mλ and τ , which is e−λMλ .
Lemma 2. A scientist choosing TS publishes after a constant maturation delay Mλ and








e−λMλL(Mλ) if τ ≥ Mλ
e−λτ L(Mλ) if τ < Mλ
The scientist’s technological choice is determined by comparing the latter payoff to
the CS payoff, pL(M)−c. When pL(M)−c ≥ L(Mλ), the 0-born scientist always prefers
CS. It implies that any scientist discovering the idea after that time always prefers
CS. Hence, there cannot exist a discontinuity in the scientists’ equilibrium strategies.
When pL(M) − c < e−λMλL(Mλ), then no matter their discovery times, scientists always
prefer the technological choice TS. In this way, there cannot exist a discontinuity in the
equilibrium strategies.
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Eventually, a discontinuous equilibrium potentially exists when
L(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c > e−λMλL(Mλ)
⇔pL(M) − L(Mλ) ≤ c < pL(M) − e−λMλL(Mλ)
This range of values is depicted in Figure 2. Denote τ ∗ ∈ [0, Mλ] the threshold
discovery rate such that scientists born before that time publish with TS after the
maturation delay Mλ and scientists born after choose CS. To simplify the analysis, I













Figure 2 – a discontinuous stationary equilibrium may exists when the CS cost c is
intermediate
Assumption 3.
τ ∗ ≤ Mλ
In this way, the two scientists always publish after time τ ∗, that is, P (σ̃ > τ ∗) = 1.
A potential candidate for the threshold τ ∗ would be the discovery time at which the
τ ∗-born scientist is indifferent between the two technological choices. In other words,
e−λτ
∗
L(Mλ) = pL(M) − c. In fact, the scientist born at τ ∗ always strictly prefers CS.
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Hence, it cannot be a threshold candidate. A second potential candidate would be such
that e−λ(τ
∗∗+Mλ)L(Mλ) = e
−λτ∗L(Mλ)(= pL(M) − c). Then this candidate would be
τ ∗∗ = τ ∗ − Mλ < 0, which is impossible. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists no symmetric stationary equilibrium in which there exists
a τ ∗ ∈ [0; Mλ] such that
• Scientists born before τ ∗ publish with TS after the maturation delay Mλ;
• Scientists born after τ ∗ choose CS.
As a matter of fact, the fear of being preempted is too high for early-born scientists so
that they always have an interest in deviating by choosing CS. The technological choice
TS is always left aside, which implies that the technological choice CS completely shifts
the research landscape. Indeed, as soon as the latter choice is available for scientists,
there is no adjustment delay during which they can adapt their research habits to the
new CS technological change. This harms the early-borns scientists who are the first
ones to adapt very quickly to the technological change. This profitable deviation implies
that in the pink area in Figure 2, scientists always choose CS. Consequently, there exist
only two kinds of stationary equilibria, which contain no discontinuity in the scientists’
strategies.
Proposition 2. There exist two kinds of symmetric stationary equilibria:
• If c > pL(M) − e−λMλL(Mλ), scientists publish with TS after the maturation delay
Mλ;
• If c ≤ pL(M) − e−λMλL(Mλ), scientists choose CS.
If CS is expensive, scientists choose TS. Otherwise, they choose CS. To compare
with BBM, where the technological choice CS does not exist, the equilibrium payoff
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remains the same in the first case. Consequently, scientists do not benefit from the
existence of the CS technological choice. In the first case, without the existence of the
technological choice CS, in BBM, a τ -born scientist born after the time corresponding
to the equilibrium maturation delay Mλ enjoys the payoff e
−λMλL(Mλ). If she is born
before that time, she enjoys the payoff e−λτ L(Mλ). This payoff must be compared to
pL(M) − c, which is the payoff that every scientist enjoys with CS at equilibrium.
If c > pL(M) − e−λτ L(Mλ), the τ -born scientist is born early. Without the existence
of the CS technological choice, she faces a low preemption risk and enjoys her position
of discovering the idea early. She looses this advantage when every scientist chooses CS.
Hence, her payoff is strictly lower than without the existence of the CS technological
choice and she looses from CS. If instead, e−λτ L(Mλ) ≤ pL(M) − c, the τ -born scientist
is born late. Without the existence of the CS technological choice, there is a high
preemption risk, which is reflected in her low payoff. This risk vanishes when all
scientists choose CS. Consequently, her payoff is strictly higher with CS and she benefits
from the existence of the CS technological choice. Therefore, CS has an heterogeneous
effect on scientists: it favors the late borns and harms the early borns.
To go further, the early-borns scientists who have the most interest to deviate from
TS are the ones born just before the cut-off τ ∗. Hence, if their equilibrium maturation
delay becomes smaller when they discovers the idea closer to τ ∗, their fear of being
preempted is smaller. In this way, a discontinuous equilibrium may exist, in which the
equilibrium scientists’ strategy is non-stationary. In the following subsection, I study
this kind of equilibrium.
3.2 Existence of a non-stationary discontinuous equilibrium
Suppose that there exists a symmetric equilibrium exhibiting a τ̄ ∈ (0, +∞) such that
every scientist born before τ̄ chooses TS and everybody after chooses CS. To simplify
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the analysis, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.
σ(0) > τ̄.
It ensures that all scientists publish after time τ̄ , that is, P (σ̃ > τ̄) = 1. A discontin-
uous equilibrium satisfying this assumption is depicted in Figure 3. At equilibrium, a
scientist born just before τ̄ chooses TS and waits whereas another one born just after τ̄
chooses CS. As a matter of fact, the difference between the equilibrium payoff of these
two scientists tends to 0 as the discovery time of the former tends to τ̄ . It implies that











Figure 3 – a discontinuous equilibrium satisfying Assumption 4, where scientists choose
TS when born before τ̄ and choose CS when born after
Lemma 3. The equilibrium payoff function is continuous on [0; +∞].
In that way, the payoff of the τ̄ -born scientist remains the same with the two
technological choices. Consequently, she must be indifferent between the two options.
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Hence, for ǫ > 0 small enough, I have
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) ≥
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄).
It means that, if ǫ is small enough, the (τ̄ − ǫ)-born scientist has a larger equilibrium
payoff than the τ̄ -born one. By solving the former’s maximization problem, knowing that
the latter is indifferent between the two technological choices, she must have discovered
the idea before time 0. It follows that, necessarily, at equilibrium, the τ̄ -born scientist
always strictly prefers CS to TS. Therefore, such a discontinuous equilibrium does not
exist. The essence of the proof is similar to Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. There exists no symmetric equilibrium in which there exists a τ̄ in
[0; σ(0)) such that scientists born before τ̄ choose TS and the ones born after or at τ̄
choose CS.
As in Proposition 1, the non-existence of this type of equilibrium implies that the
early-borns scientists must adapt quickly to the technological change CS. Even scientists
discovering the idea just before τ̄ , and publishing after a small maturation delay, have
interest in deviating by choosing CS. Besides, from Lemma 3, the τ̄ -born scientist is
indifferent between the two technological choices. In this way, an equilibrium containing
an equilibrium strategy which is continuous at τ̄ may exist. This is what I study in the
next subsection.
3.3 Existence of a non-stationary continuous equilibrium
Suppose that there exists a symmetric equilibrium with a τ̄ ∈ (0, +∞) such that
scientists born before τ̄ choose TS and the ones born after choose CS. I assume that σ
is continuous on [0, +∞). An equilibrium of this type is depicted in Figure 4.









Figure 4 – a continuous equilibrium in which scientists choose TS when born before τ̄
and choose CS when born after
Because σ is left-continuous at τ̄ , the equilibrium maturation delay σ(τ) − τ is
decreasing in τ over [0; τ̄). In this way, the equilibrium payoff function tends to 0 on
the left of τ̄ as τ tends to τ̄ . Besides, the τ̄ -born scientist chooses CS. It implies that if
the discovery time is close enough below τ̄ , the equilibrium payoff of a scientist born at
that time who chooses TS is lower than the CS payoff. Hence, she strictly prefers CS to
TS. Here lies a contradiction and there exists no such equilibrium.
Proposition 4. There exists no symmetric equilibrium in which there exists a τ̄ ∈
[0; +∞) such that:
• σ is continuous on [0, +∞);
• Scientists born before τ̄ choose TS;
• Scientists born after or at τ̄ choose CS.
In this kind of equilibrium, early-born scientists would have shifted softly from TS
to CS. Unfortunately, the latter does not exist. Together with Propositions 1 and 3, it
means that if CS is low-cost, scientists must adapt quickly to the technological change.
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Furthermore, the latter creates a congestion in the use of CS. This technological choice
requires the help of citizens, who have limited attention and time. In this way, they
cannot work for both scientists at the same time. This questions the existence of an
asymmetric equilibrium, in which the two scientists would have different technological
choices. This is what I study in the following subsection.
3.4 Existence of an asymmetric stationary equilibrium
Suppose that, at equilibrium, scientist i chooses CS and scientist j publishes with TS
after a maturation delay Mλ. This equilibrium must satisfy Inequality 4 for scientist
i and Inequalities 2 and 3 for scientist j, that is, for any discovery times τ i ≥ 0 and
















pL(M) − c ≥ V i(ti, τ i, τ j + Mλ)
V j(τ j + Mλ, τ
j, τ i) ≥ V j(tj, τ j, τ i)
V j(τ j + Mλ, τ
j, τ i) ≥ pL(M) − c
(6)
Inequality 6 implies that the CS cost belongs to the grey area in Figure 2. As a
matter of fact, a scientist who discovers the idea before the maturation delay Mλ has no
preemption risk in a symmetric equilibrium. By contrast, in such an asymmetric equi-
librium, there exists a preemption risk that her comptetitor publishing instantaneously
with CS discovers the idea before her. This preemption risk is high so that she has a
strictly profitable deviation by choosing CS. In this way, there exists no asymmetric
equilibrium in which one scientist chooses CS and the other publishes with TS after
waiting a delay Mλ.
Proposition 5. There exists no asymmetric equilibrium in which one scientist chooses
CS and the other publishes with TS after the maturation delay Mλ.
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This type of equilibrium would have eliminated the congestion problem with CS. In
addition, in terms of policy implications, such an equilibrium would have benefited the
government fundings. Indeed, if money has to be allocated to citizen science, then it
must be splitted between the two scientists.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I studied the scientists’ trade-off between citizen science and traditional
science when they fight for preemption. I prove that there exist no equilibrium such
that scientists born early choose TS and the ones born late choose CS. There always
exists a profitable deviation for a scientist born close below the discovery time threshold
which is to choose CS. This harms the early-born scientists who have no time to
adapt to the technological change. Interestingly, there exist two kinds of symmetric
stationnary equilibria: if CS is a low-cost technological choice, then every scientist
chooses CS. Otherwise, everyone chooses TS and waits a constant maturation delay
before publication. Researchers in the second kind receive the same payoff as BBM,
whereas in the first kind, early borns are harmed and late borns are better-off than
without the existence of CS. Hence, my model increases preemption fear compare to
BBM.
This chapter provides some government policies to adopt regarding CS. It depends on
whether the government (he) is interested in maximizing the scientists’ payoff or letting
the idea mature optimally. If his objective is the second, he should always encourage
CS as the idea is always mature at its best whereas the maturation delay is stricly lower
with TS. If the government is interested by maximizing the scientists’ payoff, then his
action has no impact if CS is expensive. If CS is low-cost, then everybody choosing CS
at equilibrium harms the early-borns and benefits the late-borns. If the government
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aims at increasing the publication speed, then he should encourage CS. If he puts more
weight on the early-borns than on the late-borns, then he should restrict the CS use.
To go further, it would be interesting to prove is that the equilibrium publication
time increasing in the discovery time is a necessary condition to have an equilibrium. In
this way, similarly to Proposition 4, I would prove that there cannot exist a discontinuity
point in the equilibrium publication time. Hence the only existing symmetric equilibrium
would be that every scientist chooses CS.
In a more general setting, scientists could pay a cost in a continuous range of values
to reduce the maturation delay. In this way, they could enjoy the same publication
payoff than the model without investment but earlier in time. This modelization reflects
well the scientist’s allocation of time between several ideas. Should she invest more time
in ideas which brings a higher publication payoff later or a lower payoff sooner? This
setting would increase the concavity of the payoff function and the optimal maturation
payoff will be achieved earlier. At equilibrium, they will choose both the publication time
and the investment cost. The equilibrium analysis is not obvious since the scientist’s
choice is two-dimensional.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Procede by contradiction. Suppose that there exist τ and τ̂ in [0; τ̄ ] such that τ̂ ≥ τ
and σ(τ) > σ(τ̂). As τ and τ̂ both satisfy Inequality 2, then
P (σ̃ > σ(τ))
P (σ̃ > τ)
L(σ(τ) − τ) ≥ P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂))
P (σ̃ > τ)
L(σ(τ̂) − τ)
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂))
P (σ̃ > τ̂)
L(σ(τ̂) − τ̂) ≥ P (σ̃ > σ(τ))
P (σ̃ > τ̂)
L(σ(τ) − τ̂)
By adding the two latter inequalities, I have
P (σ̃ > σ(τ))L(σ(τ) − τ) + P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂))L(σ(τ̂) − τ̂) ≥ P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂))L(σ(τ̂) − τ) + P (σ̃ > σ(τ))L(σ(τ) − τ̂)
⇔ P (σ̃ > σ(τ))(L(σ(τ) − τ) − L(σ(τ) − τ̂)) ≥ P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂))(L(σ(τ̂) − τ) − L(σ(τ̂) − τ̂)) (7)
L is increasing and concave on [0, M ], hence
0 < L(σ(τ) − τ) − L(σ(τ) − τ̂) < L(σ(τ̂) − τ) − L(σ(τ̂) − τ̂) (8)
Moreover, P (σ̃ > .) is non increasing, which implies that
P (σ̃ > σ(τ)) ≤ P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂)) (9)
But from Inequalities 7 and 8, I must have
P (σ̃ > σ(τ)) > P (σ̃ > σ(τ̂))
This contradicts Inequality 9. Consequently, σ is nondecreasing in τ .
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Proof of Lemma 2
The first order condition with respect to t is:
−λ.φ̇(t)e−λ.φ(t)L(t − φ(t)) + e−λ.φ(t)L̇(t − φ(t)) = 0
⇔ λ.φ̇(t) = L̇(t − φ(t))
L(t − φ(t))





A solution to this EDO is





It implies that the maturation delay, Mλ, depends on the discovery rate λ but not
on the discovery time τ :















e−λ(τ−Mλ) if τ > Mλ
1 otherwise
= e−λmax{0;τ−Mλ}
Therefore, the ex-ante payoff of a τ -born scientist who chooses TS, described in
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Equation 5, becomes
P (τ̃ > φ(τ + Mλ))













e−λMλL(Mλ) if τ ≥ Mλ
e−λτ L(Mλ) if τ < Mλ
Proof of Proposition 1
I look for a profitable deviation for the τ ∗-born scientist. Her payoff when choosing TS




After τ ∗ + Mλ, the only scientists who did not publish yet are born after τ
∗, that is,
P (σ̃ > τ ∗ + Mλ) = P (τ̃ > τ
∗ + Mλ).
Moreover, due to Assumption 3, P (σ̃ > τ ∗) = 1. Then
P (σ̃ > τ ∗ + Mλ)
P (σ̃ > τ ∗)
L(Mλ) = P (τ̃ > τ
∗ + Mλ)L(Mλ) = e
−λ(τ∗+Mλ)L(Mλ).
By definition, τ ∗ is such that e−λτ
∗
L(Mλ) = pL(M) − c. It implies that
P (σ̃ > τ ∗ + Mλ)
P (σ̃ > τ ∗)
L(Mλ) = e
−λ(τ∗+Mλ)L(Mλ) = (pL(M) − c)e−λMλ < pL(M) − c.
Therefore, the τ ∗-born has a profitable deviation which to choose CS. In this way, a
discontinuous equilibrium with such a threshold τ ∗ does not exist. A second potential
candidate would be τ ∗∗ such that
e−λ(τ




but then τ ∗∗ = τ ∗ − Mλ < 0, which is impossible. Consequently, there exists no such τ ∗∗
in [0; Mλ]. For any τ in [0; Mλ], it is always profitable to choose CS instead of waiting
Mλ with TS. Hence, a discontinuous stationnary equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that pL(M) − c ≥ e−λMλL(Mλ) and fix τ ≥ 0. Suppose that both scientists
choose CS and look for a profitable deviation for the τ -born scientist. The strategy of
her opponent is σ̃(τ̃) = τ̃ . If the τ -born scientist deviates by choosing TS and publishing
at time t > τ , she obtains the following payoff:
P (σ̃ > t)
P (σ̃ > τ)
L(t − τ) = P (τ̃ > t)
P (τ̃ > τ)
L(t − τ) = e−λ(t−τ)L(t − τ)




s.t. e−λ(t−τ)L(t − τ) ≥ pL(M) − c
The FOC of the unconstrained problem is:
− λe−λ(t−τ)L(t − τ) + e−λ(t−τ)L̇(t − τ) = 0
⇔ L̇
L
(t − τ) = λ
⇔t = τ + (L̇
L
)−1(λ) = τ + Mλ (10)
Then the scientist has a payoff of e−λMλL(Mλ). The constrained problem payoff
would be even lower. However, pL(M) − c ≥ e−λMλL(Mλ), therefore the scientist has
no profitable deviation. This result holds for any τ . Consequently, the stationnary
150 CHAPTER 3. CITIZEN SCIENCE AND PREEMPTION
equilibrium in which scientists always choose CS is sustainable.
Now assume that pL(M) − c < e−λMλL(Mλ) and fix τ ≥ 0. Suppose that both









e−λMλL(Mλ) if τ ≥ Mλ,
e−λτ L(Mλ) if τ < Mλ.
Besides, for all τ ∈ [0; Mλ],
e−λτ L(Mλ) ≥ e−λMλL(Mλ) > pL(M) − c.
Therefore there is no profitable deviation for the τ -born scientist and the stationnary
equilibrium in which scientists choose TS and wait Mλ before publication is sustainable.
Proof of Lemma 3
Over the interval [0, τ̄ ], the equilibrium payoff function is equal to P (σ̃>σ(τ))
P (σ̃>τ)
L(σ(τ) − τ),
which is continuous in τ . Over the interval (τ̄ , +∞), the equilibrium payoff function
is equal to pL(M) − c, which is continuous in τ . The remaining point is to prove
that the equilibrium payoff function is continuous at τ̄ . Fix ǫ > 0 and look at the
(τ̄ − ǫ)-born scientist. Her equilibrium payoff should tend to pL(M) − c as ǫ tends to 0.
At equilibrium, as she chooses TS and wait until τ̄ − ǫ before publication, her payoff
should be greater than if she chooses CS, that is,
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) − pL(M) − c ≥ 0
Besides, at equilibrium, the (τ̄ + ǫ)-born scientist prefers CS than TS and publishing
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at σ(τ̄), that is,
pL(M) − c ≥ P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ)
L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ))
It implies that
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ))−
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ)
L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ))
≥ P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) − pL(M) − c ≥ 0
Therefore,
|P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ))−pL(M) − c|
≤|P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) −
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ)
L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ))|
≤|P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) −
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄)|
+ |P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) − P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ)
L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ))|
The equilibrium payoff function is left-continuous at τ̄ . Hence, the first part of the
right-hand side of the inequality tends to 0 as ǫ tends to 0. The second part of the
right-hand side of the inequality is equal to
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
(
L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄)
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
− L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ)
)
L is continuous on [0, +∞), then limǫ→0 L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ)) = L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄). Moreover,
for ǫ small enough,
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ) = P (τ̃ < τ̄) + P (τ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ)
= 1 − e−λτ̄ + e−λ(τ̄+ǫ) < 1
⇒ lim
ǫ→0
P (σ̃ > τ̄ + ǫ) = 1 − e−λτ̄ + e−λτ̄ = 1






P (σ̃ > τ̄)
− L(σ(τ̄) − (τ̄ + ǫ))




0 ≤ |P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) − pL(M) − c| ≤ ξ(ǫ)
with ξ(ǫ) ≥ 0 and limǫ→0 ξ(ǫ) = 0. Therefore, by the Sandwich theorem,
lim
ǫ→0
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) = pL(M) − c
and
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) = pL(M) − c
Consequently, the equilibrium payoff function is continuous at τ̄ , hence, continuous
on [0; +∞).
Proof of Proposition 3
With Lemma 3, I have proved that the τ̄ -born scientist is indifferent between the two
technological choices, that is,
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) = pL(M) − c. (11)
Besides,
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄)) = P (τ̃ > σ(τ̄)) = e−λ.σ(τ̄)
Therefore, Equation 11 becomes
e−λ.σ(τ̄)L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) = pL(M) − c (12)
5. APPENDIX 153
Every scientist born after τ̄ chooses CS, hence, P (σ̃ > t) = P (τ̃ > t) = e−λt. The




P (σ̃ > t)
P (σ̃ > τ̄)
L(t − τ̄) = max
t≥τ̄




− λe−λσ(τ̄)L(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) + e−λσ(τ̄)L̇(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) = 0
⇔ L̇
L
(σ(τ̄) − τ̄) = λ
⇔σ(τ̄) = τ̄ + (L̇
L
)−1(λ) = τ̄ + Mλ
Replacing in Equation 12, I have
e−λ(τ̄+Mλ)L(Mλ) = pL(M) − c
This means that τ̄ = τ ∗∗, which is the threshold found in Proposition 1. However,
τ ∗∗ < 0, which implies that there exists no such τ̄ in [0; +∞). Consequently, there exists
no discontinuous equilibrium with a threshold τ̄ in [0, σ(0)] below which scientists born
before that threshold choose TS and above which the ones born after choose CS.
Proof of Proposition 4
Fix ǫ > 0. At equilibrium, the (τ̄ − ǫ)-born scientist enjoys from TS the following payoff:
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ))
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As σ(τ̄) = τ̄ ,
lim
ǫ→0
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄ − ǫ))
P (σ̃ > τ̄ − ǫ) =
P (σ̃ > σ(τ̄))





σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ) = σ(τ̄) − τ̄ = 0
⇒ lim
ǫ→0
L(σ(τ̄ − ǫ) − (τ̄ − ǫ)) = L(0) = 0
It implies that, as ǫ tends to 0, the equilibrium payoff of the τ̄ -born scientist tends to
0, which is smaller than pL(M) − c. Hence, she strictly prefers CS than TS. This holds
for any τ̄ in [0; +∞). Consequently, there exist no such a discontinuous equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5
From Equality 1, I have
V i(ti, τ i, τ j + Mλ) =
P (τ̃ j + Mλ > t
i)
P (τ̃ j + Mλ > τ i)
L(ti − τ i)
V j(τ j + Mλ, τ
j, τ i) =
P (τ̃ i > τ j + Mλ)
P (τ̃ i > τ j)
L(Mλ)
= e−λMλL(Mλ)
V j(tj, τ j, τ i) =
P (τ̃ i > tj)
P (τ̃ i > τ j)
L(tj − τ j)
= e−λ(t
j−τj)L(tj − τ j)




j−τj)L(tj − τ j)
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is given by Equation 10. Hence, the optimal maturation delay is Mλ. Besides,
P (τ̃ j + Mλ > t
i)
P (τ̃ j + Mλ > τ i)
=
P (τ̃ j > ti − Mλ)






















i−τ i) if Mλ ≤ τ i
e−λ(t
i−Mλ) if τ i < Mλ ≤ ti
1 if Mλ > t
i
There are three cases.








e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ e−λ(ti−τ i)L(ti − τ i)
e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ e−λ(tj−τj)L(tj − τ j)
It must hold for any ti and tj, in particular, the ones which maximizes e−λ(t
i−τ i)L(ti −
τ i) and e−λ(t








e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ e−λMλL(Mλ)
e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ e−λMλL(Mλ)
⇔ e−λMλL(Mλ) = pL(M) − c








e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ e−λ(ti−Mλ)L(ti − τ i)
e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ e−λ(tj−τj)L(tj − τ j)
⇔ e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ e−λ(t
i−Mλ)L(ti − τ i)
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The maturation delay ti − τ i which maximizes e−λ(ti−Mλ)L(ti − τ i) is still Mλ.
Consequently, the condition become
e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ e−λτ
i
L(Mλ)




⇔ τ i ≥ Mλ
As τ i < Mλ, it is impossible and the condition never holds.
3) If τ i < Mλ and Mλ > t








e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ L(ti − τ i)
e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ e−λ(tj−τj)L(tj − τ j)
The publication time ti which satisfies Mλ > t
i and maximizes L(ti − τ i) tends to
Mλ. Hence, the conditions become
e−λMλL(Mλ) ≥ pL(M) − c ≥ L(Mλ)
This is impossible as e−λMλ < 1.
Hence, such an asymmetric equilibrium does not exist.
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